Espina Law Office

Have a blessed and prosperous 2024 💥🥳

Manigong Bagong Taon mula sa Kataas-taasang Hukuman ng Pilipinas! 🎉

ABISO:

Suspendido ang pagpapatupad ng expanded number coding scheme sa mga susunod na araw ngayong holiday season:

• Lunes, Disyembre 25, Christmas Day
• Martes, Disyembre 26
• Lunes, Enero 1, 2024, New Year's Day

Saan man ang destinasyon ngayong Kapaskuhan, laging tandaan: planuhin ang biyahe, sumunod sa batas trapiko, at mag-ingat sa pagmamaneho.

Happy holidays!

"Similar with the Formal Assessment Notice (FAN), the personal delivery of the Notice of Informal Conference (NIC) and the Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) must be served only upon the taxpayer or his/her duly authorized representatives."

SC: Only Authorized Representatives of Taxpayer May Receive BIR Preliminary Assessment Notice |

Similar with the Formal Assessment Notice (FAN), the personal delivery of the Notice of Informal Conference (NIC) and the Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) must be served only upon the taxpayer or his/her duly authorized representatives.

This was the ruling of the Supreme Court’s Third Division, in a Decision penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, as it granted the petition for review on certiorari filed by Mannasoft Technology Corporation (Mannasoft). The petition challenged the rulings of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc which had upheld the deficiency tax assessments issued against Mannasoft.

In granting Mannasoft’s petition, the Court stressed that when the CIR finds that proper taxes should be assessed, the taxpayer must be properly notified of its findings, in accordance with Section 228 of the Tax Code. Further, Section 3.1.4 of Revenue Regulations No. (RR) 12-99 states that personal delivery of the formal letter of demand and assessment notice must be acknowledged by the taxpayer or his/her duly authorized representative. The same provision requires the signee-recipient to indicate their “designation and authority to act for and in behalf of the taxpayer.”

The Court held that such requirements are necessary for “unless the recipient possesses a certain degree of authority or discretion, they would be unable to grasp the gravity of the service of an assessment notice and the potential impact it would have to the taxpayer they purport to serve and represent.” “This is especially true for juridical entity taxpayers who can only act through its officers and employees, and who would otherwise be prejudiced by such recipient’s simple ignorance,” stressed the Court. The Court also clarified that while the provisions of RR 12-99 governing the NIC and the PAN bear no similar qualifications for personal delivery as those found under Section 3.1.4, “the Court deems it more in keeping with the spirit of the law that these should likewise be served only upon the taxpayer or, especially for juridical entities, their duly authorized representatives.” The Court held that such an interpretation is consistent with the oft-repeated principle that the sending and actual receipt of the PAN is part and parcel of the due process requirement in the issuance of a deficiency tax assessment that the BIR must strictly comply with.

In the present case, the Court found that those who received the subject NIC and PAN were not authorized representatives of Mannasoft. As the NIC and the PAN were not properly served on Mannasoft, the succeeding FAN was void and without effect, ruled the Court. The Court added that even if the NIC and PAN were deemed properly served on Mannasoft, the FAN is still void for being improperly served on a reliever security guard who was not even an employee of Mannasoft, and whose authority was not indicated in the stamp receipt, contrary to the requirement in Section 3.1.4 of RR 12-99.

Read more at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-only-authorized-representatives-of-taxpayer-may-receive-bir-preliminary-assessment-notice/. Read G.R. No. 244202 in full at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/244202-mannasoft-technology-corporation-vs-commissioner-of-internal-revenue/.

"the Court restated its 2022 ruling in People v. Casa that in case of warrantless seizures, the inventory and taking of photographs, which is the first link in the chain of custody of drugs cases, generally must be done at the place of seizure.

The exception to this rule is where the physical inventory and taking of photographs of the seized item may be conducted at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer or team, provided that police officers have justification that (1) it is not practicable to conduct the same at the place of seizure or (2) the items seized are threatened by immediate or extreme danger at the place of seizure, held the Court"

SC: Inventory and Taking Photos of Seized Drugs Must be Done at the Place of Seizure |

In the chain of custody in drugs cases, the seizure and marking, including the physical inventory and photograph-taking, of the seized drug must be done immediately at the place of arrest.

Thus reiterated the Supreme Court’s Special First Division in a Decision penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, as it granted the motion for reconsideration filed by Allan S. Almayda (Almayda) and Homero A. Quiogue (Quiogue). The motion for reconsideration challenged the Resolution of the Supreme Court affirming the conviction of Almayda and Quiogue for violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

In granting their motion, the Court restated its 2022 ruling in People v. Casa that in case of warrantless seizures, the inventory and taking of photographs, which is the first link in the chain of custody of drugs cases, generally must be done at the place of seizure.

The exception to this rule is where the physical inventory and taking of photographs of the seized item may be conducted at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer or team, provided that police officers have justification that (1) it is not practicable to conduct the same at the place of seizure or (2) the items seized are threatened by immediate or extreme danger at the place of seizure, held the Court.

The Court added that when the police officers are able to provide a sensible reason, which is practicable, consistent, and not merely generic or an afterthought, then the courts will recognize that the police officers may indeed conduct the inventory at the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. Such reason must be indicated in the affidavits of the police officers who participated in the buy-bust operation.

In the present case, it is undisputed that the inventory and photograph-taking of the seized shabu were done at the PDEA office, not at the place of arrest. However, the prosecution witnesses failed to give any justification for their deviation from the general rule. Hence, the first link in the chain of custody was broken.

The Court also clarified that even if the succeeding links in the chain of custody were compliant with the requirements under the law, this does not serve to cure the breach which attended early on the first link. “There was already a significant break [in the chain of custody] such that there can be no assurance against switching, planting, or contamination even though the subsequent links were not similarly infirm,” held the Court.

Read more at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-inventory-and-taking-photos-of-seized-drugs-must-be-done-at-the-place-of-seizure/. Read G.R. No. 227706 (People v. Almayda and Quiogue, June 14, 2023) in full at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/227706-people-of-the-philippines-vs-allan-almayda-y-selfides-and-homero-quiogue-y-adornado/.

Consult your lawyers when is the proper time to file the Declaration of Actual Use after you successfully register your Trademark as there are various periods within which the law requires the filing of DAU to maintain your Trademark registration.

You've been protecting your IP for years now, don't let it end. Dahil sa trademarks, may "forever".

Maintain "walang hanggan" with your trademarks by filing the Declaration of Actual Use (DAU), in addition to the Request for Renewal.

Learn more about here: https://bit.ly/IPOPHL-TM

2024 Bar Exam Modality, Schedule, Syllabi and Coverage
(BAR BULLETIN NO. 1)

Believe in yourself and trust in the Lord with all your heart🙏🏻 You are destined to become a lawyer⚖️

📢 Notice Re: Release of Results; Oath Taking and Roll Signing Ceremonies for the 2023 Bar Examinations

In anticipation of the release of the Results and the List of Successful Examinees for the 2023 Bar Examinations, please scan the following QR Codes for the livestream links, for simultaneous access by the public.

Guidelines for the Oath Taking and Roll Signing Ceremonies are also issued in the Notice.

READ the Notice in full at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Dec4-Notice-Re-Results-Oath.pdf.

Guidelines on Actual Notice to Concerned Courts in Financial Rehabilitation Proceedings

COHABITATION OF AN ADULT WITH A CHILD OUTSIDE OF WEDLOCK?
This is considered as crime and punishable under Republic Act No. 11596 and the adult partner shall be penalized with prision mayor and a fine of not less than Php 50,000.00. If the offender is a public officer he shall likewise be dismissed from service and may be perpetually disqualified from holding public office at the discretion of the courts.

According to Section 6 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations, since this is considered a public crime, their prosecution may be initiated by any concerned individual.

Important Guidelines for the Payment of the 13th Month Pay

“According to Artes, the increased fines for the violation of the exclusive city bus lane/EDSA carousel lane regulation for both public and private vehicles are:

First Offense: P5,000
Second Offense: P10,000 plus one-month suspension of the driver’s license and required to undergo a road safety seminar.
Third Offense: P20,000 plus one-year suspension of driver’s license
Fourth Offense: P30,000 plus recommendation to the Land Transportation Office for revocation of driver’s license”

SC Upholds Disability Claims of Seafarer Injured while Playing Basketball |

The Supreme Court has ordered a ship management company and its corporate officers to pay US$90,000 as total and permanent disability benefits to its seafarer employee who suffered an injury while playing basketball on board a ship during his free time.

In a 21-page Decision penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the Court granted the petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Rosell R. Arguilles (Arguilles) which sought to annul and set aside the January 24, 2020 Decision and November 9, 2020 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA). The said issuances of the CA affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Resolution which, in turn, reversed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter in favor of Arguilles in a complaint for disability benefits against his former employer, respondents Wilhelmsen Smith Bell Manning, Inc., its principal Wilhelmsen Ship Management Ltd., and Fausto R. Preysler, Jr.

Arguilles, a Seaman, suffered an ankle injury on December 26, 2016, while playing basketball on board the vessel M/V Toronto. Despite medical repatriation and surgery, his disability claims which were initially granted by the Labor Arbiter was later reversed by the NLRC, a decision affirmed by the CA. The Supreme Court, however, ruled in favor of Arguilles, emphasizing that playing basketball was an employer-sanctioned activity and not a reckless or deliberate act, making the injury compensable. The Court emphasized the relevance of the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract and the collective bargaining agreement in determining Arguilles' claims, stating that the injury fell within the definition of a work-related injury. Additionally, the Court highlighted the duty of employers to provide a seaworthy ship and take precautions to prevent accidents and injuries to the crew, as outlined in the POEA SEC.

The Court also held that Arguilles' entitlement to full disability benefits had lapsed due to the absence of a certification within specified periods, and it declared the corporate officers jointly and severally liable with the ship management company for the total judgment award, citing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

Read more at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-upholds-disability-claims-of-seafarer-injured-while-playing-basketball/. Read the Decision in full at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/254586-rosell-r-arguilles-vs-wilhelmsen-smith-bell-manning-inc-wilhelmsen-ship-management-ltd-and-fausto-r-preysler-jr/.

SC: Senate Committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in Issuing Contempt and Arrest Orders vs. Pharmally Resource Persons |

While the Senate has the power to conduct legislative inquiries, it must observe the Constitutional right to due process of the persons appearing before such proceedings.

Thus held the Supreme Court En Banc, in a Decision penned by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, partly granting the petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Linconn Uy Ong (Ong) and Michael Yang Hong Ming (Yang). The petitions challenged the contempt and arrest orders issued against them by the Senate of the Philippines.

In 2021, the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Senate Blue Ribbon Committee) conducted an investigation in aid of legislation pertaining to the Department of Health’s expenditures in relation to the government’s COVID-19 pandemic response. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee issued subpoenas directing officers of Pharmally Pharmaceuticals Corporation (Pharmally), including Ong as Pharmally Board of Directors member and Supply Chain Manager, as well as Yang, a member of the Philippine Full Win Group of Companies, Inc., to attend the Committee hearings and testify. Ong and Yang initially failed to appear at the first hearings, but later voluntarily attended the hearing on September 10, 2021. The Committee, however, issued an order against Ong and Yang citing them for contempt and ordering their arrests for “testifying falsely and evasively” during the hearings. These prompted Ong and Yang to file their respective petitions before the Court.

The Court clarified that the Senate's contempt power is inherent, allowing it to compel information necessary for legislative functions. However, the court emphasized three limitations: the inquiry must aid legislation, follow published rules of procedure, and respect the rights of those involved. In the case of Ong and Yang, the court found that the Senate failed to provide due process by citing them for contempt without allowing them to be heard, emphasizing that legislative inquiries should not result in a legally binding deprivation of life, liberty, or property.

The Court, however, upheld the Senate's authority to request a lookout bulletin against Yang, stating a compelling state interest in investigating the misuse of government funds related to the pandemic response.

Read more at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-senate-committed-grave-abuse-of-discretion-in-issuing-contempt-and-arrest-orders-vs-pharmally-resource-persons/. Read the Decision in full at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/257401-257916-linconn-uy-ong-vs-the-senate-of-the-philippines-the-senate-committee-on-accountability-of-public-officers-and-investigations-blue-ribbon-committee-hon-senator-richard-j-gordon-in/.

Court reiterated that to maintain the powers of co-equal departments of the government, the Court cannot exercise its powers that belongs to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.

SC: Senate Should Follow Own Rules in Resolving Committee Jurisdictional Challenge

To maintain the separation of powers between the three departments of the government, the Court cannot exercise a power that belongs to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (SBRC).

Thus held the Supreme Court En Banc, in a Decision penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, denying the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Senate of the Philippines challenging the constitutionality of a Memorandum issued by then President Rodrigo Duterte.

The controversy stemmed from the SBRC's investigation into the budget utilization of the Department of Health (DOH) in response to a report from the Commission on Audit (COA) revealing a significant deficiency in public funds allocated for COVID-19 response. While the SBRC initiated hearings to address these issues, executive officials ceased attending after President Duterte's Memorandum directed them not to participate, alleging that the committee was encroaching upon the mandates of other branches of government.

In denying the Senate’s petition, the Court found that it failed to meet the requisites for a petition for certiorari to prosper. Under Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the following are required for a petition for certiorari: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of law.

The Court, however, found that the Senate’s petition failed to meet the third requisite as the SBRC itself has a remedy within its office to resolve the jurisdictional challenge raised by the President in the Memorandum.

Under Section 3 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (Senate Rules), if the jurisdiction of the Committee is challenged on any ground, the said issue must first be resolved by the Committee before proceeding with any inquiry.

According respect for the Senate’s own rules, the Court thus deferred to the remedy found in the Senate Rules, which effectively proscribes a premature resort to the present petition.

Read more at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-senate-should-follow-own-rules-in-resolving-committee-jurisdictional-challenge/. Read the Decision in full at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/257608-the-senate-of-the-philippines-represented-by-the-senate-president-vicente-c-sotto-iii-senate-president-pro-tempore-ralph-g-recto-senate-majority-f-zubiri-senate-minority-floor-leader-fra/.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/257608-concurring-and-dissenting-opinion-justice-marvic-m-v-f-leonen/ and the Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/257608-dissenting-opinion-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/.

In Trademark applications tainted with bad faith or fraud, meaning there is a prior knowledge of prior use of another entity and an applicant despite of this fact has applied for registration, trademark application should be denied.

SC Rules on CYMA Restaurant Trademark Row |

In trademark applications, when an entity has prior use, creation, or registration of a trademark and the applicant has knowledge of said prior use, creation, or registration, the trademark application may not be registered due to bad faith, and should therefore be denied.

Thus said the Supreme Court in a Decision penned by Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr., as it has rejected a trademark application for the mark used by the Greek restaurant “Cyma” filed by Manuel T. Zulueta, who claimed to have conceptualized the restaurant.

In denying Zulueta’s petition, the Supreme Court highlighted that the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (IPC) defines “mark” as “any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise.” Stressing that trademarks deal with the psychological function of symbols and the effects that they have on the public, the Court said: “Thus, the protection of trademarks as intellectual property is intended not only to preserve the goodwill and reputation of the business established on the goods or services bearing the mark through actual use over a period of time, but also to safeguard the public as consumers against confusion on these goods or services.”

The Court held that the general rule is that ownership of a mark is acquired through registrations made in accordance with the IPC. “Under the first-to-file rule, ‘a registered mark or a mark with an earlier filing or priority date generally bars the future registration of…an identical or a confusingly similar mark, in respect of the same of loosely-related goods or services, if the resemblance will likely deceive or cause confusion.’”

The Court, however, said that the first-to-file rule should not be taken to mean that in all cases, the first application to be filed should be the application that is granted.

“Registrations resulting from trademark applications which are tainted with bad faith or fraud are void ab initio; thus, it follows that such trademark applications are inherently unregistrable and do not confer any priority rights on the part of the applicant,” stressed the Court. Where in the course of a trademark application, it is found that: “(i) an entity has prior use, creation and/or registration of a trademark; and (ii) the applicant has knowledge of the said prior use, creation and/or registration—the trademark application in unregistrable due to the attendance of bad faith on the part of the applicant, and the same should be denied.”

Applying the same to Zulueta’s petition, the Court said that the findings of the IPOPHL show that Zulueta’s trademark application was done in bad faith. As a partner, Zulueta was aware of the prior use of the trademark by Cyma Partnership, and that it had been Goco who conceptualized the mark for the partnership.

The Court said that even if it were to believe that it was Zulueta and not Goco who had conceived the Cyma mark, “it is clear from Zulueta’s own narration that the mark had been conceived for the exclusive use of the partnership and its sister company, Cyma Greek Taverna Shangri-la Corporation.” Noting that Zulueta never used the Cyma trademark in his individual capacity, the Court added that despite the fact that it was Zulueta who was the first to file a trademark application, his knowledge of the prior use of the trademark by the Cyma Partnership meant that his trademark application was filed in bad faith.

“As a consequence, his trademark application cannot be granted and he did not obtain any priority rights under Section 123(d) of the IPC,” ruled the Court.
The Court found that Cyma Partnership, on the other hand, validly obtained a Certificate of Registration and ownership over the subject mark, which, under Section 139 of the IPC, shall be “prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the same in connection with the goods or services and those that are related thereto specified in the certificate.” The Court considered this and Zulueta’s bad faith in filing Trademark Application No. 4-2006-010623 in ruling that the IPOPHL-BLA, IPOPHL-ODG, and the CA were correct in denying Zulueta’s trademark application.

Read more at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-rules-on-cyma-restaurant-trademark-row/. Read the Decision in full at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/205699-manuel-t-zulueta-vs-cyma-greek-taverna-co/.

Careful of what you post online. Imprisonment is an alternative penalty aside from imposition of fines

SC: For Online Libel, Courts May Impose Alternative Penalty of Fine Instead of Imprisonment |

A court may sentence an accused found guilty of online libel to payment of fine only, rather than imprisonment.

Thus held the Supreme Court En Banc, through Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr., as it denied the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the People of the Philippines against Jomerito S. Soliman. The petition claimed that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicting Soliman for online libel and sentencing him to pay a fine of PhP50,000.

In 2018, Soliman faced charges for online libel under the Cybercrime Prevention Act (Republic Act No. 10175) for a Facebook post criticizing Waldo R. Carpio, then Assistant Secretary of the Department of Agriculture. The Regional Trial Court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and imposed a fine of PhP50,000, citing Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 08-2008. Soliman paid the fine and did not appeal his conviction. However, the Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals, alleging an abuse of discretion by the RTC for imposing a fine instead of imprisonment.

Section 6 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act imposes upon online libel, or libel committed through information and communication technologies, a penalty that is one degree higher than ‘traditional’ libel, or libel under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Under the RPC, as amended by RA 10951, the penalty for traditional libel is “prision correcional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from PhP40,000 to PhP1,200,000, or both.”

The Court ruled that the RPC recognizes that the penalty of fine may be imposed as a single or alternative penalty for libel, as evident in the RPC’s “plain use of the disjunctive word ‘or’ between the term of imprisonment and fine, such word signaling disassociation or independence between the two words.”

Read more at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-for-online-libel-courts-may-impose-alternative-penalty-of-fine-instead-of-imprisonment/.

Read the Decision in full at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/256700-people-of-the-philippines-vs-jomerito-s-soliman/. Read the Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/256700-concurring-opinion-chief-justice-alexander-g-gesmundo/ and the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/256700-separate-opinion-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/.

No Senior Citizen Discount for Golf and Country Club Membership Dues

SC: Senior Citizen Discount Does Not Apply to Golf and Country Club Membership Dues |

Non-profit, stock golf and country clubs are not mandated to give a 20% senior citizen discount to their senior members on membership dues. However, the senior citizen discount applies to fees for locker rentals and other charges pertaining to their use of the clubs’ facilities and equipment.

Thus ruled the Supreme Court’s First Division, in a Decision penned by Associate Justice Jose Midas P. Marquez, partially granting the consolidated petitions under Rule 45 filed by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and The Manila Southwoods Golf and Country Club, Inc. (Manila Southwoods).

In partially granting the petitions, the Court clarified the scope of the 20% senior citizen discount mandated by Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act.
The Court held that the senior citizen discount under Section 4(a) expressly applies to the sale of goods and services.

The Court thus declared that associations charging membership dues are not required to give the 20% senior citizen discount, in accordance with Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act, which does not grant the discount on the collection of dues for the privilege of membership. However, golf and country clubs are required to provide qualified members with the 20% senior citizen discount on payment of fees for locker rentals as well as other charges pertaining to the members’ purchase of services provided by the club.

The Court further ruled that the assailed provision, Rule IV, Article 7, Section 4 (2), of the IRR, is invalid for carving out an exemption for non-profit, stock golf and country clubs, when the Expanded Senior Citizens Act, which mentions recreation centers in general, provides none. The Court also dismissed DSWD’s argument that the Expanded Senior Citizens Act should be limited to basic goods and services supplied to underprivileged senior citizens by establishments catering to the general public.

Reiterating its 2017 ruling in Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. DSWD, the Court held that to “recognize all senior citizens as a group, without distinction as to income, is a valid classification.” It added that “[w]hen the Constitution declared its intention to prioritize the predicament of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women and children, it did not make any reservation as to income, race, religion, or any other personal circumstances. It was a blanket privilege afforded to the group of citizens in the enumeration in view of the vulnerability of their class.”

Read more at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-senior-citizen-discount-does-not-apply-to-golf-and-country-club-membership-dues/. Read the Decision in full at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/202417-203245-hon-corazon-j-soliman-in-her-capacity-as-secretary-of-the-department-of-social-welfare-and-development-vs-carlos-t-santos-the-manila-southwoods-golf-and-country-club-inc-vs-carlo/.