Law Knowledge

"Territorial jurisdiction of Family Court"

Family Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the wife or mother falling in the domain of Family Laws, at the place of her own choice.

2017 C L C Note 8
[Sindh (Hyderabad Bench)]
Before Mahmood A. Khan, J

Mst. BUSHRA SAEED and another---Petitioners
Versus
6th ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE HYDERABAD and 2 others---Respondents

C. P. No.S-696 of 2016, decided on 9th September, 2016.

Family Courts Act ( # # of 1964)---

Ss. 5 & 6---Family Courts Rules, 1965, R. 6---Territorial jurisdiction of Family Court---Scope---Suit for maintenance and recovery of dowry articles---Husband filed application under R. 6 of Family Courts Rules, 1965 for return of plaint on the ground that wife resided in another district---Trial Court returned the plaint and appellate court upheld the order of Trial Court---Validity---Wife allegedly resided in another district and suit was filed by her in the Family Court of the said District---Application of wife was maintainable under the Family Courts Rules, 1965---Court of law could not restrict and create classification in the matter subsequent to the date of amendment in the Family Courts Act, 1964---Family Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the wife or mother falling in the domain of Family Laws, at the place of her own choice---Wife had alleged that she was permanently residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the court where the application in question was moved---Controversy of the parties about the territorial jurisdiction would be decided after recording evidence of the parties---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances by setting aside the order of courts below. [Paras. 9 & 10 of the judgment]

Mst. Yasmeen Bibi v. Muhammad Ghazanfar Khan PLD 2016 SC 613; Mahbub Ahmed v. First Additional District Judge and another PLD 1976 Kar. 978; Syed Nazim Hussain Zaidi v. IV Additional District Judge Karachi 2013 YLR 400; Syed Ziaul Hassan Gilani v. Mian Khadim Hussain and 7 others PLD 2001 Lah. 188; Mst. Fozia v. Azizullah and 2 others 2010 CLC 403; Mst. Irshad Mai v. Additional District Judge and another 1997 CLC 742; Abdul Razak v. Mst. Rehana Akhtar and another 1993 CLC 1538 and Rizwan Mahmood v. Collector and others 1991 CLC 1078 ref.

Irfan Ahmed Qureshi for Petitioners.

Ghulam Haider Memon for Respondent No.3.

Ali Abbas Memon, State Counsel.

ORDER

MAHMOOD A. KHAN. J.---This constitutional petition is filed by Mst. Bushra Saeed for herself and on behalf of minor daughter Noorul Huda against learned VI-Additional District Judge Hyderabad, IV Senior Civil Judge Hyderabad and a private respondent Ali Raza son of Ghulam Hyder, challenging the appellate judgment dated 16.4.2016 as passed by respondent No.1 in Family Appeal No.18 of 2016 upholding the order dated 10.2.2016 as passed by the respondent No.2 in Family Suit No 1177/2015 returning the plaint of the petitioner under Rules 5 and 6 of West Pakistan Family Courts Rules 1965, the parties not objecting to its decision at this katacha peshe stage.

2. It is contended on behalf of petitioners that the family case was competently presented, whereon summonses were issued against respondent No.3 who filed written statement raising objection to the territorial jurisdiction along with an application under sections 5 and 6 of West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the said application) praying therein for the return of the plaint on the ground that plaintiff was married at Karachi and lastly resided there and that she is still residing in Karachi, working in post office at Karachi. The petitioner filed her counter affidavit to said application denying the allegation and stated that she is permanently residing at Hyderabad with her family and her residence at Karachi was only for studies purpose. The trial Court as well as the Appellate Court however returned the plaint and upheld the decision violating the fundamental right of the petitioner.

3. It is further contended that the learned Courts have passed the impugned orders without considering that under the Family Laws it is for the female plaintiff to determine her ordinary residence. In furtherance of the arguments as to determination of the ordinary residence the learned counsel has relied upon the reported cases PLD 2016 SC page 613 Re: Mst. Yasmeen Bibi v. Muhammad Ghazanfar Khan, (2) PLD 1976 Karachi page 978 Re: Mahbub Ahmed v. First Additional District Judge and another (3) 2013 YLR page 400 Syed Nazim Hussain Zaidi v. IV Additional District Judge Karachi, (4) PLD 2001 Lahore page 188 Re: Syed Ziaul Hassan Gilani v. Mian Khadim Hussain and 7 others (5) 2010 CLC page 403 Re: Mst. Fozia v. Azizullah and 2 others, (6) 1997 CLC 742 Re: Mst. .Irshad Mai v. Additional District Judge and another (7) 1993 CLC page 1538 Re: Abdul Razak v. Mst. Rehana Akhtar and another and (8) 1991 CLC page 1078 Re: Rizwan Mahmood v. Collector and others along with Pakistan Citizenship Rule 4(1) and the meaning of the word residence in the Black Law Dictionary in order to establish distinction between residence and domicile.

4. On service respondent No.3 effected appearance and filed his objection to the petition, supported the concurrent findings and relied upon the contents of his pleadings before the learned trial Court along with Rules 5 and 6 of West Pakistan Family Courts Rules 1965. It is further contended that Family Suit was wrongly filed in order to cause monetory loss and harassment to the said respondent with unclean hands. It is also disclosed that the said respondent has filed Family Suit No.625 of 2016 for restitution of conjugal rights before the court of Family Judge-XX East at Karachi.

5. In the matter the learned trial court had passed the order dated. 10.2.2016 (hereinafter referred to as the said order) wherein contentions of the parties have been recorded and portion of the relevant law have been cited, as comprehended by the learned trial court and a distinction has been made in respect of suits for dissolution of marriage or dower, specially on account of 2nd proviso of section 7(2) of Family Courts Act, 1964. It is held therein, considering the contents of the counter affidavit to the said application said to not having denied working at the post office, CNIC old and new, including the presence of the minor (details of which otherwise had not come forward) that as the suit is for maintenance and recovery of dowry articles only, the plaint be returned referring to the following authorities;

i. PLD 2005 SC page 22-Mohammed Iqbal v. Perveen Iqbal, although the 2nd proviso is discussed therein.

ii. 2010 CLC page 403-Mst. Feroza v. Azizullah, a case discussing the Territorial Jurisdiction in dissolution of marriage being where wife resides.

iii. 2010 CLC page 405-Mureed Abbas v. Additional District Judge Tausa Sharif Dist. D.G. Khan, a case discussing rate of gold given in the nikahnama.

iv. 2012 MLD page 259-Mohammed Imran v. Family. Court Bhawalpur.

The learned appellate court also heard the parties and upholding the said order further quoted rules 5 and 6 of the Family Courts Rules, 1965 along with section 7(2) of Family Courts Act, 1964 and based its order to the understanding of legislation to be read in juxtaposition and to be interpreted in isolation.

6. As to the enactment under discussion the relevant portions of the same are quoted below;

Family Courts Act, 1964, section 7, second proviso to subsection (2) reads as under after amendment by the Ordinance of 2002 dated 01.10.2002;

Provided that a plaint for dissolution of marriage may contain all claims relating to dowry, maintenance, dower, personal property and belongings of wife, custody of children and visitation rights of parents to meet their children and

The jurisdiction of a Family Court is discussed in section 5 of the Family Courts Act, 1965 reads as;

5. (1), Subject to the provision of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, the Family Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain, hear and adjudicate upon matters specified in Part I of the Schedule.

The Schedule after the above referred amendment.

SCHEDULE

PART-I

[See SECTION 5]

1. Dissolution of marriage including Khula

2. Dower.

3. Maintenance.

4. Restitution of conjugal rights.

5. Custody of children and the visitation rights of parents to meet them

6. Guardianship.

7. Jactitation of marriage.

8. Dowry.

9. Personal property and belongings of a wife.

Whereas the relevant of The West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965 are;

5. Where a plaint is presented to a Court not having jurisdiction-

(a) the plaint shall be returned to be presented to the Court to which it should have been presented;

(b) the Court returning the plaint shall endorse thereon the date of its presentation to it and its return, the name of the party presenting it, and a brief statement of the reasons therefor.

6. The Court which shall have jurisdiction to try a suit will be that within the local limits of which-

(a) the cause of action wholly or in part has arisen, or

(b) where the parties reside or last resided together;

Provided that in suits for dissolution of marriage or dower, the Court within the local limits of which the wife ordinarily resides shall also have jurisdiction.

(underlining made by me for emphasis)

7. The said amendment as such has brought in and made available to the Family Court, disputes earlier restricted to dissolution of marriage only without any classification and discrimination after the date of amendment to the wife where she ordinarily resides. The ordinarily resides in view of the authorities relied upon by the learned counsel of the petitioner is by her choice or circumstances as they may be. Reference in this regard can also be made to 2008 CLC page 850-Rana Zahid Saeed v. Judge, Family Court Sahiwal wherein the element of family laws being special laws is also discussed.

8. In the present matter following two elements have not been considered by the learned courts depriving the petitioner from obtaining justice in accordance with law being;

1. The relevant rule of interpretation simplified that the sections of a statute override the rules and not vice versa.

2. It is for the parties to present their cases as they deem fit and proper (of course within the limits as prescribed) and only after evidence it is open for a court of law to come to any definite conclusions/understandings.

9. As to the law it is not open to a court of law to restrict and create classification in the matter subsequent to the date of amendment. The substance of the matter being a controversy of place described as "ordinarily resides", the petitioner being the wife is the best judge and where she claims to be the same as Hyderabad, the same can only be dislodged by her alone irrespective to the denials of anyone else, especially the respondent No.3 though he may have filed his own case for restitution of conjugal rights before another court (plaint of said suit for reasons best known to the said party has not been brought forward).

10. In my humble understanding there was never a lacking of jurisdiction to the family court at Hyderabad enabling return of the plaint and even if a dispute otherwise seemed present to the learned presiding officer the same could only have been decided after leading of evidence by the parties by taking the same as an issue only and findings available only after the parties have not gone through the said process on merits. In this regard I have put this question to the learned counsel to which the learned counsel reiterated their stand forgiven, however the learned state counsel conceded that the matters are liable to be decided on merits.

11. In the circumstances, this petition is allowed; the order of the VI-Additional District Judge Hyderabad dated 16.4.2016 in Family Appeal No.18 of 2016 and the Order of IV Senior Civil Judge Hyderabad dated 10.2.2016 in Family Suit No.1177/2015 of the petitioner are set aside. It is, however, upon the learned trial court to frame the issue in accordance with law based upon the pleadings of the parties, however, till the element is decided after evidence on the basis of the claims made by plaintiff the learned trial court is liable to be considered having jurisdiction. It is expected that learned trial court shall decide the matter in accordance with provisions and applicable law within time frame as required therein.

JK/B-15/Sindh Petition allowed.
Regards .Adv Azhar Ali Bohio

" Disability and Disabled Person".

P L D 2017 Lahore 1
Before Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, CJ

Hafiz JUNAID MAHMOOD---Petitioner
Versus
GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.2565 of 2014, heard on 19th December, 2016.

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199--- Constitutional petition--- Maintainability--- Public/ Government policy----Judicial review---Scope---Government policy was generally enforceable against a citizen when it was translated into legislation, subordinate legislation or executive action, and such legislation or executive action was then subject to judicial review---Policy, generally, was a guideline for the internal working of the Government, however, if such Policy impinged upon the Fundamental Rights of a citizen, then the same could be judicially reviewed, like any other legislation or executive action.

Executive District Officer (Revenue), District Khushab at Jauharabad and others v. Ijaz Hussain and another 2011 SCMR 1864; Aqsa Manzoor v. University of Health Sciences, Lahore through Vice-Chancellor and 3 others PLD 2006 Lah. 482; Lt. Muquddus Haider v. Federal Public Service Commission through Chairman, Islamabad 2008 SCMR 773; Punjab Public Service Commission and another v. Mst. Aisha Nawaz and others 2011 SCMR 1602 and Mian Muhammad Afzal v. Province of Punjab and others 2004 SCMR 1570 ref.

Human Rights case No.14392 of 2013 (2014 PTD 243); Messrs Al-Raham Travels and Tours (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Hajj, Zakat and Usher through Secretary and others 2011 SCMR 1621; Messrs Shaheen Cotton Mills, Lahore and another v. Federation of Pakistan, Ministry of Commerce through Secretary and another PLD 2011 Lah. 120 and Wattan Party through President v. Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Committee of Privatization, Islamabad and others PLD 2006 SC 697 rel.

(b) Words and phrases---

----"Disability" and "disabled person"---Meanings---"Disability" meant lacking one or more physical powers, such as the ability to walk or to coordinate one's movements, as from the effects of a disease or accident, or through mental impairment---"Disabled person" was a person who, on account of injury, disease or congenital deformity, was handicapped for undertaking any gainful profession or employment in order to earn his livelihood and included a person who was blind, deaf, physically handicapped or mentally retarded---Persons with disabilities included those who had long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments, which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others---"Disability" was an evolving concept and resulted from interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hindered their full and effective participation in a society---"Disabilities" was an umbrella term, covering impairments, activity limitations and participation restrictions---Impairment was a problem in body function or structure---Activity limitation was difficulty encountered by an individual in executing a task or action, while a participation restriction was a problem experienced by an individual in involvement in life situations---"Disability" was not just a health problem, and was a complex phenomenon reflecting the interaction between features of a person's body and features of the society in which he or she lived.

UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD or Convention) and World Health Organization (2016) Disabilities, Retrieved on December 19, 2016 from http://www.who. int/topics/disabulities/en/ rel.

----Arts. 9, 14, 25, 8, 2A, 4 & Preamble---United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, Ratified by Pakistan in 2011---Fundamental Rights in the context of persons with disabilities---Constitutional values of universality, indivisibility interdependence and interrelatedness of all human rights and fundamental freedoms---Concept of "reasonable accommodation" for disabled persons---Constitutional obligations of the State with regard to disabled persons---Scope---Constitution proactively reached out to persons with disabilities with force and vigour and the wisdom of the United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, was already embedded in the soul of the Constitution and could be easily rediscovered by using principles of the said Convention to purposively interpret the Constitution---Right to life, dignity and equality were further emboldened, illuminated and vitalized when interpreted in the context of the said Convention---Right to life and dignity were epicenters of the Constitutional architecture and recognized the importance of accessibility to physical, social, economic and cultural environment, to health and education, and to information and communication---Fundamental right to life, therefore, enabled persons with disabilities to fully enjoy all human rights and fundamental freedoms, and a disabled person, like every human being, had an inherent right to life and its effective enjoyment at par with others---Right to life and dignity of a person with disabilities could only be realized if the State and its institutions took steps provide "reasonable accommodation" that would facilitate and ensure that a person with disabilities could enjoy life with honour and dignity like others---Inherent in Art. 25 of the Constitution was the recognition that discrimination against any person on basis of disability was a violation of the inherent dignity and worth of a human being---Article 25 of the Constitution promoted inclusiveness, effective participation and recognized human diversity in a society and therefore mandated that reasonable accommodation be provided by the State and other institutions to actualize such Constitutional goal and to avoid exclusion of persons with disabilities from effective participation in the society---Constitutional values of social, economic and political justice recognized free choice and individual autonomy and therefore, there existed a bold and passionate Constitutional support for persons with disabilities---State and its institutions had a Constitutional obligation to ensure, within means available, that a person with disabilities got reasonable accommodation and to provide the architecture, structure, assistive and adaptive technology, system and equipment and facilitative support to persons with disabilities in order to enable them to actualize their Constitutional rights and freedom.

Pakistan To***co Co. Ltd. and others v. Government of N.-W.F.P. through Secretary Law and others PLD 2002 SC 460; Reference No.01/2012 (Reference by the President of Pakistan under Article 186 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (PLD 2013 SC 279); M/s. Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. v. Millieum Chennai Broadcast (Pvt) Ltd. 2008 (13) SCC 30; Aharon Barrack-Human Dignity---The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right. Cambridge 2015 P.144 and Jeeja Ghosh and another v. Union of India and others AIR 2016 SC 2392 rel.

(d) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Preamble & Art. 8---Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution---Nature---Interpretation of Constitutional provisions containing Fundamental Rights---Fundamental Rights were the heart and soul of a living Constitution and must at all times, be ready to embrace and protect the sensibilities and sensitivities of the people---Fundamental Rights must be progressively and purposively interpreted to advance frontiers of freedom, individual autonomy and free choice, and such vibrance and vitality were the hallmark of a living Constitution in a democracy.

Pakistan To***co Co. Ltd. and others v. Government of N.-W.F.P. through Secretary Law and others PLD 2002 SC 460 and Reference No.01/2012 (Reference by the President of Pakistan under Article 186 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (PLD 2013 SC 279) rel.

(e) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 9, 14 & 25---Recruitment Policy (2013) For Educators, Para. 4D---Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance (XL of 1981), Ss. 10, 2(c) & Preamble---United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, Ratified by Pakistan in 2011---Vires of Recruitment Policy (2013) For Educators, Para. 4D---Constitutional obligations of the State with regard to disabled persons---Interpretation of Arts. 9, 14 & 25 in the context of Constitutional protections of disabled persons---Recruitment to public/Government posts for disabled persons---Reasonable accommodation for disabled persons---Scope---Petitioner, who had permanent visual impairment, impugned the Provincial "Recruitment Policy-2013 for Educators", which barred blind persons from applying to posts of educators---Contention of the Provincial Government, inter alia, was that it was not possible for a blind teacher to use the blackboard to teach or to control the classroom---Validity---Fundamental Rights to life, dignity and equality mandated that State and its organs should make serious endeavors to provide reasonable accommodation to persons with disabilities so that they can be mainstreamed and made useful and productive members of the society---Impugned recruitment policy was devoid of any such thought or realization and lacked openness, inclusiveness and accessibility for persons with disabilities---Provincial Education Department, in the present case, had failed to consider that the petitioner could have been made able enough to teach with the help of assistive technology and qualification of the petitioner was not otherwise questioned---Ability to use a blackboard and maintain discipline could be easily achieved through assistive technology and additional human resource---Department did not take the plea that reasonable accommodation could not be provided or that the same was burdensome or cumbersome and paid no heed to the rights of the petitioner under the Constitution, United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, And The Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1981---High Court observed that the impugned Recruitment Policy to the extent of its Para. 4D, impaired Fundamental Rights of the petitioner and was accordingly declared unconstitutional and illegal and hoped that Provincial Government will set a healthy precedent for others to follow---Advocate General shall place the judgment before the authorities, so that the anguish and pain of persons with disabilities in the Province was redressed and the Government succeed in making the Province a disability sensitive Province---High Court directed the Provincial Government and the Provincial Education Department to reframe the relevant portion of the impugned Recruitment Policy accordingly, keeping in view observations of the High Court and the wisdom of the United Nations Convention On The Rights of Persons With Disabilities--- Constitutional petition was allowed, accordingly.

Assistive Technology for Visually Impaired and Blind People. Marion A Hersch, Michael A Johnson. Springer. p.670 rel.

(f) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 25, 9 & 14--- Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance (XL of 1981) S. 10---United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, Ratified by Pakistan in 2011---Fundamental Rights in the context of persons with disabilities---Recruitment to public/Government posts for disabled persons---Establishments to employ disabled persons---Reserved quota for employment of disabled persons---Nature---Scope---Interpretation of Fundamental Rights in the light of United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, indubitably showed that a person with disabilities could not be debarred from applying on open merit for the general seats and the three percent quota under the Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1981 was an additional benefit and did not restrict a person with disabilities to apply for the general quota---To restrict a person with disabilities to a limited quota of three percent, which may or may not be available, depending on the sanctioned posts, would amount to depriving equality, accessibility and opportunity to a person with disabilities and offended Art. 25 of the Constitution---Such restriction was opposed to the Constitutional mandate and the United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities.

(g) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Recruitment Policy (2013) For Educators, Para. 4D--- Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) Ss. 35 & 35A---Constitutional petition---Awarding of costs to petitioner---Scope---Petitioner, who with permanent visual impairment had to approach the High Court to impugn the Recruitment Policy of a Department of the Provincial Government under Art. 199 of the Constitution could be awarded costs, which were to be paid to the petitioner by the Provincial Government.

Kawas B. Aga and another v. City District Government, Karachi (CDGK) through Nazim-e-Ala and others PLD 2010 Kar. 182; The Postmaster-General, Northern Punjab and (AJ&K), Rawalpindi v. Muhammad Bashir and 2 others 1998 SCMR 2386; Province of Sindh through Secretary, Home Department and others v. Roshan Din and others PLD 2008 SC 132; Inayatullah v. Sh. Muhammad Yousaf and 19 others 1997 SCMR 1020; Mst. Afsana v. District Police Officer, (Operation), Khairpur and 5 others 2007 YLR 1618 and M.D. Tahir, Advocate v. Federal Government and others PLD 1999 Lah. 409 rel.

Harris Azmat and Ali Khalid Sindhu along with Petitioner in person.

Anwaar Hussain and Ahmad Hassan Khan, Assistant Advocates-General, Punjab.

Iftikhar Ahmad Mian for Respondent No.2.

Rana Muhammad Younus Aziz, Senior Law Officer, School Education Department.

Zubair Khan, Deputy Secretary, School Education Department, Government of Punjab.

Tariq Ismail, Litigation Officer, Social Welfare Department, Punjab.

Iqbal Hussain, EAD o/o EDO (Education) Lahore.

Date of hearing: 19th December, 2016.

"It is not the eyes that are blind, but the hearts"
Regards.Azhar Ali Bohio Adv

www.who

Barred suit was rejected by supreme court under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C.

S. 12---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 15, 19 & Art. 113---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 62---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, Rr. 6 & 11(d)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129---Suit for specific performance of sale agreement---Limitation---Date fixed in agreement for its completion being 31-12-1997, while plaint iff filed suit on 7-1-2003 alleging incompletion of agreement within stipulated period due to failure and inabilities of defendant to perform his part of agreement, interactions between parties and pendency of other litigation about suit property---application under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C., by defendant seeking rejection of plaint for suit being barred by time---Validity---plaintiff had not alleged in the plaint that date fixed in original agreement had been changed or dispensed with by parties vide any subsequent express agreement in writing made within original period of limitation by resorting to novation of contract or acknowledgement in terms of S. 19 of Limitation Act, 1908---Purpose of using words "on or before 31-12-1997" in agreement was to enable parties to have sale completed prior to 31-12-1997---Such words would not take out date 31-12-1997 out of realm of "date fixed" as used in First Part of Art. 113 of Limitation Act, 1908---Such date being a definite date with reference to calendar clearly and unequivocally mentioned in agreement connoted ultimate, absolute, final and "date" terminal intended and meant by both parties for completion of sale---Present suit was not covered by second Part of Art. 113 of Limitation Act, 1908, rather First Part thereof would attract thereto and limitation period would run forthwith from such date 31-12-1997 fixed by parties notwithstanding alleged failure and inabilities of defendant to perform his part of agreement for not having any relevance in context of limitation in suits covered by First Part thereof ---Such pleas raised by defendant might have relevance about question as to whether contract should be enforced by court or not, and that time was essence of contract or otherwise, but same would have nothing with proposition of limitation---plaintiff had neither alleged in plaint nor produced any order of competent court to show passing of any order restraining parties to complete suit sale and/or file suit---No exemption qua period of limitation in law could be claimed by plaint iff on account of pendency of litigation simpliciter in absence of any order of court preventing him to file suit---Present plaint from its statements appeared to be barred by limitation---Suit was dismissed in circumstances.
2012 PLD 247 SUPREME-COURT
Haji ABDUL KARIM versus FLORIDA BUILDERS (PVT) LIMITED.