Mehsud Law Associates

اگر اپ بجلی کا بل جمع نہیں کرتے تو واپڈا اہلکار اپکا میٹر نہیں اتار سکتا یہ اپکی زاتی ملکیت ہے اگر وہ ایسا کرے تو اس خلاف FIR کاٹے دفعہ 378 ,424 تعزیرات پاکستان کے تحت
Section 26 (3) Electricity act 1910

Pld 1968 Lahore 537
Pld 2002 sc 293
2000 SCMR 346

2023 SCMR 16
سپریم کورٹ نے قبل کراچی میں شاہ زیب خان نامی نوجوان کے قتل کے مقدمے میں مرکزی ملزم شاہ رخ جتوئی سمیت تمام ملزمان کی سزاؤں کے خلاف اپیل منظور کرتے ہوئے انھیں مقدمے سے بری کر دیا۔
2023 SCMR 16

The courts adjudicate the matters without being influenced by passions. The prime duty of the Court is to do justice according to its own conscience. While dealing with the life and liberty of an accused, utmost care and caution is required to be exercised by the Courts of law because slight carelessness on their part may deprive an accused person/citizen of his life and may cause irreparable hardship and damage to his family.

Anti Terrorism Act is a special law enacted with a special intent and purpose, which can be gathered from the bare reading of Preamble of the said Act. It is principle of legislation that preamble of any enactment is always considered as grundnorm of the legislation, which expresses the postulates to attract the said provision of the enactment according to its scope of legislation. As stated above, the Anti-Terrorism Act is a special enactment and special enactment needs to be taken in perspective of its own object. Any departure from same would be negation of its object and spirit. A preamble of a statute is an introductory and expressionary statement that explains the very purpose and underlying philosophy behind the enactment. To better understand the scheme of Anti Terrorism
Section 6 defines terrorist acts, Section 7 provides punishment for such acts whereas Section 8 prohibits acts intended or likely to stir up sectarian hatred mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) thereof. The word “sectarian” has been described as “pertaining to, devoted to, peculiar to, or one which promotes the interest of a religious sects, or sects, in a bigoted or prejudicial manner”. However, the word “heinous offence” has not been described in the Act. In common parlance “heinous offence” means an offence which is serious, gruesome, brutal, sensational in character or shocking to public morality and which is punishable under laws of the land. A bare reading of the Anti Terrorism Act reveals that an Anti-Terrorism Court has been conferred jurisdiction not only to try all those offences which attract the definition of ‘terrorism’ provided by the Act but also some other cases, which have been specified in Third Schedule of the Act involving heinous offences which do not fall in the said definition of terrorism. The sole purpose of trying such offences by the Anti Terrorism Court is for speedy trial of such heinous offences irrespective of the fact that they do not fall within the ambit of ‘terrorism’.

Specified heinous offences are only to be tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court and that court can punish the person committing such specified heinous offences only for commission of those offences and not for committing terrorism because such offences do not constitute terrorism. For the purposes of further clarity on this issue it is explained for the benefit of all concerned that the cases of the offences specified in entry No. 4 of the Third Schedule to the AntiTerrorism Act, 1997 are cases of those heinous offences which do not per se constitute the offence of terrorism but such cases are to be tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court because of their inclusion in the Third Schedule. It is also clarified that in such cases of heinous offences mentioned in entry No. 4 of the said Schedule an Anti-Terrorism Court can pass a punishment for the said offence and not for committing the offence of terrorism. It may be pertinent to mention here that the offence of abduction or kidnapping for ransom under section 365-A, PPC is included in entry No. 4 of the Third Schedule and kidnapping for ransom is also one of the actions specified in section 7(e) of the AntiTerrorism Act, 1997. Abduction or kidnapping for ransom is a heinous offence but the scheme of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 shows that an ordinary case of abduction or kidnapping for ransom under section 365A PPC is merely triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court but if kidnapping for ransom is committed with the design or purpose mentioned in clauses (b) or (c) of subsection (1) of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 then such offence amounts to terrorism attracting section 7(e) of that Act. In the former case the convicted person is to be convicted and sentenced only for the offence under section 365-A, P.P.C. whereas in the latter case the convicted person is to be convicted both for the offence under section 365-A PPC as well as for the offence under section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The same may also be said about the other offences mentioned in entry No. 4 of the Third Schedule to the Act pertaining to "Use of fi****ms or explosives by any device, including bomb blast in a mosque, imambargah, church, temple or any other place of worship, whether or not any hurt or damage is caused thereby", "Firing or use of explosive by any device, including bomb blast in the court premises", "Hurt caused by corrosive substance or attempt to cause hurt by means of a corrosive substance" and "Unlawful possession of an explosive substance or abetment for such an offence under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908". Such distinction between cases of terrorism and other heinous offences by itself explains and recognizes that all heinous offences, howsoever serious, grave, brutal, gruesome, macabre or shocking, do not ipso facto constitute terrorism which is a species apart.” This Court in the seven members’ bench judgment has settled the issue that not every case of grievous bodily injury or harm, damage to private property, doing anything that is likely to cause death or endangers a person’s life etc would amount to terrorism.

کرایہ دار نے مالک کے خلاف دعوی حکم امتناعی دوامی دائر کیا۔ دوران سماعت مابین فریقین راضی نامہ ہوگیا اور مدعی نے روبرو عدالت بیان قلمبند کرایا کہ وہ چھ ماہ میں اراضی متدعویہ خالی کر دیگا۔عدالت نے مدعی کے اس بیان کی روشنی میں دعوی بصیغہ واپسی خارج کردیا۔مدعی نے اپنے بیان کی پاسداری نہیں کی اور مدعاعلیہ نے اجرا دائر کر دیا
لاہور ہائیکورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ اگر کوئی فریق اپنے بیان کی پاسداری نہ کرے تو دعوی بصیغہ واپسی خارج ھونے کے باوجود بھی وہ اپنے بیان کے پابند ہے اور اسکے خلاف اجرا دائر کیا جا سکتا ھے
2018 CLC 1833

Suit for permanent injunction by the tenant---Compromise between the parties---Undertaking by plaintiff (tenant) to vacate the suit property ---Ex*****on of order ---Scope---Compromise was effected between the parties and plaintiff-petitioner got recorded his statement that he would vacate the premises within six months---Plaintiff-petitioner did not honour his undertaking and defendant-respondent moved ex*****on petition which was dismissed by the Executing Court but Appellate Court remanded the matter with the direction to decide the same in accordance with law---Validity---Provision relating to ex*****on of decree were also applicable to ex*****on of orders--- Court was equipped with the jurisdiction not only to adjudicate upon disputes and pass order rather it possessed power to get its order implemented---Suit was not simply withdrawn rather same was decided as per undertaking given by the plaintiff-petitioner---Plaintiss-petitioner was bound by his undertaking and there was no occasion for him to fall back--- Undertaking made by a party before the Court had to be given sanctiy while applying the principle of estoppel as well as moral and ethical rules---Conduct of a party was relevant in the Court--- Plaintiff-petitioner had voluntarily opted before the Court to evict the rented premises---Said undertaking had become final and absolute for him to vacate the premises and any retraction could not be permitted--- Sanctity of judicial proceedings had to be safeguarded at any cost---Scope of S.36, C.P.C. was not considered by the Executing Court-- Impugned order passed by District Judge did not call for interference Revision was dismissed in circumitances

Prohibitory Clause, Reasonable Grounds.
Further Inquiry.
2022 P Cr. L J 981

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 497---Bail---Scope---Language of S. 497(1), Cr.P.C., might have been acceptable in a colonial State where the indigenous persons did not enjoy complete citizenship and fundamental rights and the State found it expedient to lock up anyone accused of a non-bailable offence---Every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty, that the benefit of any doubt must be granted to the accused, and that bail is not to be denied to an accused as punishment---Language of S. 497(1), Cr.P.C., vests in a Court the limited discretion to determine if there exist "reasonable grounds for believing" that the accused is "guilty"---Standard applicable is that of a reasonable man and the language of S. 497(1), Cr.P.C., does not require the prosecution to satisfy the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard applicable for securing a conviction---Section 497(1), Cr.P.C. essentially requires a court to prejudge the "guilt" of an accused by applying a "reasonable" man standard, which is a lower standard than the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard, leaving almost no room to grant an accused the benefit of the doubt at the time of considering his entitlement to bail---Such, together with the innumerable offences, which prescribe a punishment of up to 10 years means that the State has to meet a very basic threshold to take away the right of a citizen to liberty guaranteed by Art. 9 of the Constitution, if he is charged with a non-bailable offence---Accused remains hauled up behind bars pending trial in which the State often fails to meet the higher "beyond reasonable doubt" standard (as reflected by conviction rate), resulting in acquittal, but also resulting in the accused having been imprisoned for years, due to denial of bail pending without ever being convicted.

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 497---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 9 & 10-A---Bail---Security of person---Right to fair trial---Scope---Denial of bail automatically becomes a punishment in view of (i) the broad category of offences that fall within the prohibitory clause, (ii) the limited discretion vested in Court in view of the language of S. 497(1), Cr.P.C., and the lax standard that applies to the prosecution to justify arrest, and (iii) the time it takes to complete trials---Such undermines the rights of an accused to liberty guaranteed by Art. 9 and pre-trial punishment without conviction prohibited by Art. 10-A and fundamental principles of fairness, due to courts required to only ascertain, tentatively, if the accused is "guilty" on the basis of a "reasonability" standard---Such assessment takes place at a time when the accused is behind bars and has no ability to fully defend himself as he does not have complete access to the material to be presented by the prosecution before the court to satisfy the "reasonability" threshold---Right to liberty in Art. 9 is subject to law---Language used in S. 497(1), Cr.P.C., creates a prescription by law which renders the right of liberty of a citizen accused of a non-bailable offence pending his trial largely meaningless.

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 497---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 9 & 10-A---Bail---Security of person---Right to fair trial---Scope---Legislature has determined the scope of discretion vested in a court to release a person on bail who has been accused of a non-bailable offence---Legislature in balancing the interest of the State in prosecuting offenders and the rights of a person to liberty (till such time that he or she has been convicted after a fair trial) could have left only the most heinous offences within the prohibitory clause of S. 497(1), Cr.P.C.---Such would probably be in line with provisions of Arts. 9 & 10-A of the Constitution and the settled principle of fairness and justice that a person is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty---Legislature has not done so and has placed fetters on the right to liberty of a person who is accused of a non-bailable offence punishable for up to ten years in prison---Only discretion vested in the Court for purposes of bail in an offence falling under S. 497(1), Cr.P.C., is for the court to satisfy itself that sufficient grounds exist to support a belief that the person arrested is guilty of an offence he has been charged---Court cannot give the words of S. 497(1), and specially the word "punishable" used therein any meaning other than its ordinary textual meaning which inevitably means that given that punishment up to ten years imprisonment is prescribed in relation to a large number of offences, the persons accused of such offences are not entitled to bail as a matter of right.

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 497---Bail---Prohibitory clause---Word "punishable"---Scope---Plain reading of S. 497, Cr.P.C. suggests that it is the maximum sentence prescribed that is to be considered in relation to an offence for purposes of determining whether or not such offence falls within the prohibitory clause---First part of S. 497(1), Cr.P.C. is permissive and allows a person arrested to be released on bail who is accused of a non-bailable offence---Second part of S. 497(1), Cr.P.C. contains a prohibition against the release of a person arrested for being accused of a non-bailable offence and has come to be recognized as the prohibitory part of S. 497 (i.e. the prohibitory clause)---Prohibition is applicable in relation to a person who has been arrested after being accused of a non-bailable offence "punishable" with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for ten years---Operative word here is "punishable"---Word "punishable" has been defined to mean "subject to a punishment" when used in relation to a person---Meaning of the word "punishable" therefore clarifies that in the event that a person has been charged for an offence which could possibly result in the punishment of ten years in prison such offence would fall within the prohibitory clause---Any offence in relation to which punishment has been prescribed in the form of a range and it has been left to the court to determine the sentence in view of the facts of the case, but the maximum punishment that could possibly be awarded for such offence is ten years, would fall within the prohibitory part of S. 497(1), Cr.P.C.---Simply put, it is the maximum punishment and not the minimum punishment in relation to an offence under P.P.C. that determines whether or not the accused is "punishable" for ten years and whether the offence in question falls within the prohibitory clause or not---Court was not to try and predict the possible sentence that would be imposed on a person under arrest for being an accused of a non-bailable offence.


Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S.497---Bail---Prohibitory clause---"Reasonable grounds"---Scope---Section 97(1) provides a broad threshold to guide the courts in exercising their discretion in bail matters---Initially the prohibitory part of section 497(1) provided that a person was not to be released on bail if there appeared reasonable grounds for believing that he was guilty of a non-bailable offence that he had been charged with---Said proviso was amended and substituted in 1923 when the prohibition was limited to offences punishable with death or transportation for life---Said provision was once again amended in 1974 and the prohibition in S. 497(1) was extended to offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for ten years---Legislative intent in view of the words used in S. 497(1) is therefore unambiguous---In relation to offences which attract a maximum punishment of less than ten years, bail is granted as a matter of right---However, in cases where a person has been arrested for a non-bailable offence the maximum punishment for which is up to ten years in prison, the court is required to determine, "if there appears reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty" of such offence---Second proviso to S. 497(1), Cr.P.C. places the responsibility of showing cause as to why an accused should not be released on bail upon the prosecution---Prosecution is to satisfy the court that reasonable grounds do exist for supporting the belief that the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with up to ten years of imprisonment---If the prosecution fails to do so, the court can admit an accused to bail under S. 497(1), Cr.P.C. even where he stands accused of a non-bailable offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for ten years.

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 497--- Bail--- "Reasonable grounds"--- Scope--- "Reasonable grounds" is an expression which connotes that the grounds be such as would appeal to a reasonable man for connecting the accused with the crime with which he is charged, "grounds" being a word of higher import than "suspicion"---However, strong a suspicion may be it would not take the place of reasonable grounds---Grounds will have to be tested by reason for their acceptance or rejection---Reasonableness of the grounds has to be shown by the prosecution by displaying its cards to the Court, as it may possess or is expecting to possess as demonstrating evidence available in the case both direct and circumstantial.


Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 497---Bail---"Reasonable grounds"---Scope---While it is not for a court to conduct anything in the nature of preliminary trial at bail stage to consider the probability of accused person's guilt or innocence---Court is to ascertain as to whether there exist any reasonable grounds upon which its belief can be founded to look on the materials placed before it by the Investigating Agency and be prima facie satisfied that some tangible evidence can be offered which if left un-rebutted may lead to the inference of guilt before it can come to the conclusion that this discretion no longer exists---Such evidently means that the discretion of the Court in refusing bail in cases of offences punishable with death or transportation is wrested away only after the Investigating Agency satisfies the Court prima facie that there are reasonable grounds in the case which if not rebutted would lead to the inference of guilt of accused persons.


Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 497---Bail---Tentative assessment---Scope---Court, in case of bail is not required to probe into the matter but has to make a tentative assessment of the material produced to ascertain whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has committed the crime.



Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 497---Bail---Reasonable grounds---Scope---Term "reason to believe" can be classified at a higher pedestal than mere suspicion and allegation but not equivalent to proved evidence---Even the strongest suspicion cannot transform in "reason to believe"--- Criteria laid down seems to be that where some tangible evidence is available against the accused which, if left un-rebutted, may lead to the inference of guilt.


Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 497---Bail---Further inquiry---Scope---Bail is to be allowed if it appears to the Court that there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into the guilt of the accused---Now what would constitute as sufficient grounds for further inquiry would depend on the peculiar facts of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down for that purpose---Every hypothetical question which can be imagined would not make it a case of further inquiry simply for the reason that it can be answered by the trial court subsequently after evaluation of evidence---Broadly speaking, the condition laid down in clause (2) of S. 497, Cr.P.C., is that there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt which means that the question should be such which has nexus with the result of the case and may show or tend to show that accused is not guilty of the offence with which he is charged.


Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 497---Bail---Discretionary jurisdiction---Structured discretion---Scope---Discretion is vested in the court to release a person on bail who has been accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or punishment up to ten years---Such discretion has to be exercised on the basis of whether or not the court has been convinced by the prosecution that sufficient material exists on record which satisfies the test of existence of reasonable grounds for the court to believe that the person is guilty of such offence which falls within the prohibitory clause.

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 392 & 411---Robbery---Dishonestly receiving stolen property---Bail, refusal of---Identification parade---Scope---Accused was alleged to have snatched mobile phone and cash from the complainant on gunpoint---Features of the accused were mentioned by the complainant and recorded in the FIR---Accused, after having been arrested in the relation to another FIR, was included in an identification parade and was positively identified by the complainant---Nothing was placed on record to establish that the identification parade was not carried out in accordance with law---Such identification parade was carried out within ten days of the accused having been arrested---Cell phone with the IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) number that is noted in the FIR was recovered from the possession of the accused---Argument that the number of the SIM Card (Subscriber Identity Module Card) installed in the phone was not mentioned in the FIR made no difference as the SIM Card was replaceable and it was the IMEI number that was unique to the phone---Petition for grant of bail was dismissed, in circumstances.

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Complete law of inheritance
جائیداد کی تقسیم:
==========

(١): جائیداد حقداروں میں متوفی پر واجب الادا قرض دینے اور وصیت کو پورا کرنے کے بعد تقسیم ہوگی.

(٢): اگر صاحب جائیداد خود اپنی جائیداد تقسیم کرے تو اس پر واجب ہے کہ پہلے اگر کوئی قرض ہے تو اسے اتارے، جن لوگوں سے اس نے وعدے کیۓ ہیں ان وعدوں کو پورا کرے اور تقسیم کے وقت جو رشتےدار، یتیم اور مسکین حاضر ہوں ان کو بھی کچھ دے.

(٣): اگر صاحب جائیداد فوت ہوگیا اور اس نے کوئی وصیت نہیں کی اور نہ ہی جائیداد تقسیم کی تو متوفی پر واجب الادا قرض دینے کے بعد جائیداد صرف حقداروں میں ہی تقسیم ہوگی.


جائیداد کی تقسیم میں جائز حقدار:
===================

(١): صاحب جائیداد مرد ہو یا عورت انکی جائیداد کی تقسیم میں جائیداد کے حق دار اولاد، والدین، بیوی، اور شوہر ہوتے ہیں.

(٢): اگر صاحب جائیداد کے والدین نہیں ہیں تو جائیداد اہل خانہ میں ہی تقسیم ہوگی.

(٣): اگر صاحب جائیداد کلالہ ہو اور اسکے سگے بہن بھائی بھی نہ ہوں تو کچھ حصہ سوتیلے بہن بھائی کو جاۓ گا اور باقی نزدیکی رشتے داروں میں جو ضرورت مند ہوں نانا، نانی، دادا، دادی، خالہ، ماموں، پھوپھی، چچا، تایا یا انکی اولاد کو ملے گا.


(1): شوہر کی جائیداد میں بیوی یا بیویوں کا حصہ:
=============================

(١): شوہر کی جائیداد میں بیوی کا حصہ آٹھواں (1/8) یا چوتھائی (1/4) ہے.

(٢): اگر ایک سے زیادہ بیویاں ہونگی تو ان میں وہی حصہ تقسیم ہوجاۓ گا.

(٣): اگر شوہر کے اولاد ہے تو جائیداد کا آٹھواں (1/8) حصہ بیوی کا ہے، چھٹا (1/6) حصہ شوہر کے والدین کا ہے اور باقی بچوں کا ہے.

(٤): اگر شوہر کے اولاد میں فقط لڑکیاں ہی ہوں دو یا زائد تو جائیداد کا دو تہائی (2/3) حصہ لڑکیوں کا ہوگا، بیوی کیلئے آٹھواں (1/8) حصہ اور جائیداد کا چھٹا (1/6) حصہ شوہر کے والدین کیلئے ہے.

(٥): اگر شوہر کے اولاد میں صرف ایک لڑکی ہو تو جائیداد کا نصف (1/2) حصہ لڑکی کا ہے، بیوی کیلئے جائیداد کا آٹھواں (1/8) حصہ ہے اور شوہر کے والدین کا چھٹا (1/6) حصہ ہے.

(٦): اگر شوہر کے اولاد نہیں ہے تو بیوی کا حصہ چوتھائی (1/4) ہو گا اور باقی جائیداد شوہر کے والدین کی ہوگی.

(٧): اگر کوئی بیوی شوہر کی جائیداد کی تقسیم سے پہلے فوت ہوجاتی ہے تو اسکا حصہ نہیں نکلے گا.

(٨): اگر بیوہ نے شوہر کی جائیداد کی تقسیم سے پہلے دوسری شادی کرلی تو اسکو حصہ نہیں ملے گا.

(٩): اور اگر بیوہ نے حصہ لینے کے بعد شادی کی تو اس سے حصہ واپس نہیں لیا جاۓ گا.


(2): بیوی کی جائیداد میں شوہر کا حصہ:
========================

(١): بیوی کی جائیداد میں شوہر کا حصہ نصف (1/2) یا چوتھائی (1/4) ہے.

(٢): اگر بیوی کے اولاد نہیں ہے تو شوہر کیلئے جائیداد کا نصف (1/2) حصہ ہے اور نصف (1/2) حصہ بیوی کے ماں باپ کا ہے.

(٣): اگر بیوی کے اولاد ہے تو شوہر کیلئے جائیداد کا چوتھائی (1/4) حصہ ہے، اور چھٹا (1/6) حصہ بیوی کے ماں باپ کا ہے اور باقی بچوں کا ہے.

(٤): اگر بیوی کے اولاد میں فقط لڑکیاں ہی ہوں دو یا زائد تو جائیداد کا دو تہائی (2/3) حصہ لڑکیوں کا ہوگا، شوہر کیلئے چوتھائی (1/4) حصہ اور باقی جائیداد بیوی کے والدین کیلئے ہے.

(٥): اگر بیوی کے اولاد میں صرف ایک لڑکی ہو تو جائیداد کا نصف (1/2) حصہ لڑکی کا ہے، شوہر کیلئے جائیداد کا چوتھائی (1/4) حصہ ہے اور بیوی کے والدین کا چھٹا (1/6) حصہ ہے.

(٦): اگر شوہر، بیوی کے والدین کی طرف سے جائیداد ملنے سے پہلے فوت ہو جاۓ تو اس میں شوہر کا حصہ نہیں نکلے گا.

(٧): اگر بیوی اپنے والدین کی جائیداد تقسیم ہونے سے پہلے فوت ہوگئی اور اسکے بچے ہیں تو بیوی کا اپنے والدین کی طرف سے حصہ نکلے گا اور اس میں شوہر کا حصہ چوتھائی (1/4) ہوگا اور باقی بچوں کو ملے گا.

(٨): اگر بیوی اپنے والدین کی جائیداد تقسیم ہونے سے پہلے فوت ہوگئی اور اسکے اولاد بھی نہیں ہے تو اسکے شوہر کو حصہ نہیں ملے گا.


(3): باپ کی جائیداد میں اولاد کا حصہ:
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(١): باپ کی جائیداد میں ایک لڑکے کیلئے دو لڑکیوں کے برابر حصہ ہے.

(٢): باپ کی جائیداد میں پہلے باپ کے والدین یعنی دادا، دادی کا چھٹا (1/6) حصہ، اور باپ کی بیوہ یعنی ماں کا آٹھواں (1/8) حصہ نکالنے کے بعد جائیداد اولاد میں تقسیم ہوگی.

(٣): اگر اولاد میں فقط لڑکیاں ہی ہوں، دو یا زائد تو جائیداد کا دو تہائی (2/3) حصہ لڑکیوں کا ہوگا، آٹھ واں (1/8) حصہ بیوہ ماں کا ہوگا اور چھٹا (1/6) حصہ باپ کے والدین کوملے گا.

(٤): اگر ایک ہی لڑکی ہو تو اس کیلئے جائیداد کا نصف (1/2) حصہ ہے، آٹھواں (1/8) حصہ بیوہ ماں کیلئے ہے اور چھٹا (1/6) حصہ باپ کے والدین کیلئے ہے.

(٥): اگر باپ کے والدین یعنی دادا یا دادی جائیداد کی تقسیم کے وقت زندہ نہیں ہیں تو انکا حصہ نہیں نکالا جاۓ گا.

(٦): اگر کوئی بھائی باپ کی جائیداد کی تقسیم سے پہلے فوت ہوگیا اور اسکی بیوہ اور بچے ہیں تو بھائی کا حصہ مکمل طریقہ سے نکالا جاۓ گا.

(٧): اگر کوئی بہن باپ کی جائیداد کی تقسیم سے پہلے فوت ہوجاۓ اور اسکا شوہر اور بچے ہوں تو شوہر اور بچوں کو حصہ ملے گا. لیکن اگر بچے نہیں ہیں تو اسکے شوہر کو حصہ نہیں ملے گا.


(4): ماں کی جائیداد میں اولاد کا حصہ:
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(١): ماں کی جائیداد میں ایک لڑکے کیلئے دو لڑکیوں کے برابر حصہ ہے.

(٢): جائیداد ماں کے والدین یعنی نانا نانی اور باپ کا حصہ نکالنے کے بعد اولاد میں تقسیم ہوگی.

(٣): اور اگر اولاد میں فقط لڑکیاں ہی ہوں دو یا زائد تو جائیداد کا دو تہائی (2/3) حصہ لڑکیوں کا ہے، باپ کیلئے چوتھائی (1/4) حصہ اور باقی جائیداد ماں کے والدین کیلئے ہے.

(٤): اور اگر اولاد میں صرف ایک لڑکی ہو تو جائیداد کا نصف (1/2) حصہ لڑکی کا ہے، باپ کیلئے جائیداد کا چوتھائی (1/4) حصہ ہے اور ماں کے والدین کا چھٹا (1/6) حصہ ہے.

(٥): اگر ماں کے والدین تقسیم کے وقت زندہ نہیں ہیں تو انکا حصہ نہیں نکالا جاۓ گا.

2022 MLD 634
The purposive beneficial and rational interpretation of section 14(2) of the Family Court Act, 1964 (Act) is that for the enhancement of maintenance allowance by the minor, the right of appeal will be available to the minor. Any other interpretation of section 14(2) of the Act would not only defeat the very purpose and object of the Act but will also frustrate the beneficial nature of section 14(2) of the Act.

The right of appeal under Section 14(2) of the Act shall not be available to the judgment debtor (father/husband) but decree holder (minor or wife) can file appeal for enhancement of decretal amount. The purposive beneficial and rational interpretation of section 14(2) of the Act made by august Supreme Court in above judgments, is also squarely applicable to the matter for the enhancement of maintenance allowance by the minor. Any other interpretation of section 14(2) of the Act would not only defeat the very purpose and object of the Act but will also frustrate the beneficial nature of Section 14(2) of the Act.

Every principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has force of binding precedent under the provisions of Article 189 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (Constitution). Both as a matter of its constitutional duty as well as the prudence and rationale of such precedents, it is incumbent that Courts enforce principle of law if clearly laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court. However, the judgment cannot be construed as “law declared” under Article 189 of the Constitution if no “ratio decidendi” is discoverable from the judgment. The expression “ratio decidendi” is the ground or reason of decision and the point in a case which determines the judgment. It is the “ratio decidendi” which is applicable to subsequent cases presenting the same problem.

Order passed by the learned civil judge, Peshawar, in respect of maintainability of civil suit against government departments/officials. The suits are not maintainable in Civil Court in light of section 24 of civil court ordinance, 1962 R/W 2(17) of CPC, because of the lack of pecuniary jurisdiction of the civil court defined under section 6 of CPC

2022 P Cr. L J 534

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----Ss. 22-A, 22-B & 154---Petition under Ss. 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C.---Police report requisitioned by Justice of Peace---Where a Justice of Peace calls for a police report, he cannot ordinarily brush aside the same---In case he proposes to give his opinion contrary to the police report he is supposed to furnish tangible reasons for not relying upon the said report.

Petitioner (accused) was the purchaser of the subject plot and the sellers and their legal heirs had no dispute with the petitioner. The petitioner got an FIR registered against persons "A" and "I" who allegedly tried to raise illegal construction and forcibly occupied the petitioner's plot. The respondent, who was an employee of "A" and "I" filed a petition under sections 22-A and 22-B, Cr.P.C. before the Justice of Peace for lodging an FIR against the petitioner. The Justice of Peace sought a report from Superintended of Police, and in pursuance thereto, a report was submitted, wherein it was mentioned that just in order to counter the case registered against persons "A" and "I", their employee i.e. the respondent had filed the application under sections 22-A and 22-B, Cr.P.C. against the petitioner; that the police had thoroughly enquired into the matter and no cognizable offence had been made out and thus prayed for dismissal of the application filed under sections 22-A and 22-B, Cr.P.C.

Justice of Peace while passing the impugned order for recording statement of respondent under section 154, Cr.P.C. had not mentioned any plausible reasons for not relying on the report, submitted by Superintendent of Police rather passed the impugned order in a mechanical manner. Once Justice of Peace called for the police report, he could not ordinarily brush aside the same. In case he proposed to give his opinion contrary to the police report he was supposed to furnish tangible reasons for not relying upon the said report.

During pendency of the present Constitutional petition, the concerned Sub-Divisional Police Officer (SDPO) was directed to personally conduct an inquiry, visit the site, call both the parties, record statements of the witnesses and submit his detailed report whether the offence as alleged by the respondent against the petitioner had been committed or not. Subsequent thereto the SDPO informed the Court that he personally conducted an inquiry into the matter and also produced detailed inquiry report containing statements of the witnesses of locality and the parties, pictures of the plot and the alleged crime scene had also been enclosed with the inquiry report. Said report stated that person "A" nominated in the FIR of the petitioner had filed different applications in such regard before different forums; that the respondent, who was an employee of "A" had failed to produce any independent, legal, cogent and convincing evidence in support of his contentions against the petitioner, and that no such occurrence as alleged by the respondent took place.

Constitutional petition was allowed, and the impugned order passed by Justice of Peace was set-aside with the directions that the respondent was at liberty to file a private complaint, if so advised, before the competent forum.

(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----Ss. 22-A & 22-B---Proceedings before the Justice of Peace---Nature---Proceedings before Justice of Peace are quasi-judicial and not executive, administrative or ministerial which could be dealt mechanically---Justice of Peace exercises quasi-judicial powers, and every case before him demands discretion and judicial observations.