Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center

Crazy Creek Fire – Oregon

As the Crazy Creek Fire was rapidly expanding the Complex Incident Management Team (CIMT) set up a spike camp at Paulina Rodeo Grounds to reduce travel time for resources on the south end of the fire. Late on the night of August 3, a hotshot crew came to Paulina Spike Camp to eat dinner and sleep, arriving after 2230. Unable to find anyone in charge at the time, they quickly ate dinner and bedded down in a grassy area where both tents and some parked vehicles were located. Ater midnight, a driver in a pickup arrives at the spike camp seeking a place to sleep. He turns off his lights to avoid disturbing sleepers, and inadvertently runs over the legs of a hotshot crewmember sleeping in the grass. Quickly medics are located and treatment begins on the injured hotshot. Soon an additional, unrelated medical emergency occurs at Paulina Spike Camp: a cardiac emergency. Both patients are taken to the helispot, where bolt-cutters are necessary to gain access through a locked gate. First the cardiac patient, then the hotshot are taken to medical care via separate air ambulances.

Key Lesson:
Clearly mark sleeping areas to keep vehicles away. If necessary, use a pole or handtool with flagging to warn drivers of people on the ground.

Get the full report here:
https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/crazy-creek-fire-run-over-by-vehicle-2024

On August 2, 2024 at approximately 1600, fire behavior on the Limepoint Fire started picking up in Division Papa. Division Papa’s and Branch’s vehicles were both parked in a small bare dirt clearing outside the fireline. A cache of supplies was stacked next a small tree located beside the road. This cache included: four Mark 3 pumps and their support kits, a substantial amount of hose, and several jerry cans of torch mix. Around 1730, the fire continued to move quickly through the timber stringers, torching and spotting. As the surrounding trees started torching, crews in the area moved the fuel cans away from the group of supplies and then they assembled on the main road, approximately 400 feet away. As trees continued to torch and spot,

Division Papa and Branch were contacted to locate their vehicle’s keys so they could be moved. There was now fire around the entire parking area. Branch’s keys were located and that vehicle was removed. Division Papa had locked their vehicle and taken the keys on the fireline with them. Due to Division Papa’s current location, they were not able to quickly return to their vehicle. As the trees around the area torched out, an ember landed in and ignited that pile of hose. The nearby supplies also began to burn. Division Papa’s vehicle was parked within 10 feet of these supplies. Attempts were made by a UTV with a water tank to hose down the burning supplies and the vehicle—but the area became too hot and the UTV had to retreat from that area.
Once the keys arrived, the vehicle was moved away from the radiant heat/flames.

Key Lesson: Consider leaving vehicle keys tucked away in a strategic location on the vehicle.

Get the full report here:
https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/limepoint-fire-burned-vehicle-2024

Pioneer Fire, Washington
Members of a Camp Crew drove a UTV to get fuel for the camp generators. While enroute to the fuel tender, the driver lost control, veering off the road and crashed into the side railing of a wooden bridge.

Onsite fireline Advance Life Support providers started treatment within five minutes of this UTV accident.
Measures Taken by Incident Medical Staff:
Patient #1 – C-spine precautions/backboard. Injury: Altered mental status
Patient #2 – C-spine precautions/backboard. Injury: Hematoma on forehead
Patient #3 – Splint on arm/IV fluids. Injury: Possible fractured forearm
All patients were packaged and relocated to a preestablished helispot and flown to local medical facilities for treatment.

The individuals involved shared that they were not wearing seat belts or helmets.
On this incident, the UTV driver previously had a quick one-to-two-minute instruction on UTV operation and was shown only: Park, Reverse and High Gear.

Lessons the Driver and Passengers Want to Share
1. Provide adequate UTV training prior to assignment.
2. Follow policy and safety procedures during UTV driving operations.

Read the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/pioneer-fire-utv-accident-2024

Bridge Creek Fire - Washington

On July 22, 2024, a bulldozer was assigned to build indirect line. The Heavy Equipment Boss and Dozer Operator walked around the area on foot to establish a plan. After talking it over they decided where to start and began work. As the line was being pushed the Dozer Operator felt his blade hit a rock and he lifted the blade to pass over the rock. Once he believed he was past the rock and his tracks were stable, the Dozer Operator put his blade back down and began to push again. He was not aware that the entire dozer was on a large rock face. As the Dozer Operator began to push, he lost all control of his machine. The dozer began an uncontrolled slide down the rock face eventually rolling over and coming to rest on its cab.

Read this 3 page report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/bridge-creek-fire-dozer-rollover-2024

NEW Blog Post!
Video - Country Fire Burnover 2019

"The engine wouldn't engage into drive. We were going to have to shelter in place."

"The windows were starting to fail and to roll down. It was a pretty scary situation. I had some thoughts in my head that we might not make it out."

"All of the plastic inside the cab just started smoking."

View this short blog post with video here: https://wildfirelessons.wpcomstaging.com/2024/07/23/country-fire-engine-burnover-2019/

Montana DNRC UTV Training Rollover

On June 19, 2024, the Northwestern Land Office’s Libby Unit was conducting their annual Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (MT-DNRC) approved ATV/UTV training utilizing agency-qualified instructors. This one-day training was split into one half-day of classroom instruction and one half-day of hands-on ATV/UTV operation. The training course began with a briefing on course layout, cadre expectations, safety protocols, and incident/accident response—concluding with the students navigating the course.

Five different UTVs/ATVs would be utilized on the course: one ATV; two six-wheeled UTVs; and two MRZRs (military version of the Polaris RZR), one four-seat and one two-seat version. The operator proceeded through The Serpentine on the two-seat MRZR and attempted to make a U-turn when the UTV rolled over onto its right side and continued to tip until it rested upside down. Still inside the UTV, the operator and passenger quickly checked each other for injuries and said they appeared okay. Students and cadre tipped the UTV back upright. Once upright, the two occupants exited the vehicle. The UTV was assessed for damage. One broken weld was found in the rollover protection system.

Lesson: Take a tactical pause when you identify pace is increasing as familiarity with machines increases.

Get all the details from this 2 page report: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/montana-dnrc-utv-training-accident-2024

A helicopter was assisting with an external cargo refresher class when the pilot experienced a mechanical issue. Due to low rotor RPM the pilot was forced to jettison a longline and initiate an autorotation to land the helicopter in an open area 200ft from the originally intended pad.

Keep in mind that if a pilot initiates emergency procedures with anything attached, it is likely that the first step will be to jettison the load. This can result in hundreds—even thousands—of pounds falling out of the sky, putting anyone below it at serious risk.

How does your crew train for unplanned events?

Get more details from the 3 page report: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/idaho-longline-training-helicopter-autorotation-2024

Chainsaw Evaluation Vehicle Tree Strike
Three U.S. Forest Service employees set out on the morning of May 8, 2024, to conduct a chainsaw operator evaluation at a popular campground on the District. Shortly after the first sawyer finished felling two trees during his evaluation, the second sawyer completed the back cut on his first tree of the day, inadvertently severing the hinge on the “offside”.
This resulted in the loss of control of a 25-inch DBH grand fir that was 80 feet in height, causing it to fall 45 degrees off the intended lay.
Instead of committing to the undercut and the lay communicated by the sawyer, heavy branch loading on one side of the canopy took over and redirected the tree after the hinge was severed, subsequently breaking a portion of the remaining hinge as it left the stump. This caused the fir to fall across the campground road and strike the parked fire vehicle that belonged to the evaluator administering the evaluations.
Damage was done to the utility boxes and to a chainsaw that was in the truck. Fortunately, no one suffered any physical injuries as a result of this event.

Lesson: Avoid parking within striking distance of tree felling operations.

Get the 6 page report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/chainsaw-evaluation-vehicle-tree-strike-2024

We were honored to participate with in a delivery of L-580 – Leadership is Action, Gettysburg Staff Ride.

NEW blog post!

Wildland Firefighting - How We Got to 1994 This post takes us on a historical journey leading up to the 1994 wildland fire season, providing a perspective of how change unfolded—bringing the wildland fire community through decades of innovation and improvement.

On April 3, 2024, a sawyer from an Interagency Hotshot Crew sustained serious face and head injuries and was knocked unconscious by a large branch during a tree felling operation.
After verbalizing the elements of the O-H-L-E-C process to the captain, and getting the go-ahead to start felling the tree, the sawyer began initiating the undercut using a chainsaw equipped with a 36” bar. After a small clean up on the off side of the undercut, he noticed it was aiming a little further left then he anticipated, but after reassessing the gunning sight for the intended lay, he verbalized that it was still acceptable considering the heavy branching on the right side of the tree.
The sawyer then proceeded with his felling (back) cut using a quarter cut on the tree. The sawyer started cutting on the right side first, secured his cut with a wedge, and then proceeded to cut the left side of the tree. As the tree was committed to the fall, the faller used one of the 2 identified escape routes and was 10-15 feet away from the stump in a 45-degree direction from the intended lay. It is believed the falling tree was about 90% committed into the fall when it caught a neighboring green tree, bending it almost to the ground before it snapped the branch from the falling tree, propelling the 7” DBH limb approximately 12’ 4” long approximately 50 feet at the faller. The branch directly impacted the faller to his head and face, impacting his hard hat and safety glasses before knocking him to the ground unconscious.
The supervisor and crewmember on scene initiated a coordinated medical response using available first aid resources and immediate notification requesting an ambulance and hospital transport for evaluation and treatment.

Wearing all the proper, quality Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) was crucial to minimizing the injuries the sawyer sustained.

Get the full report here:
https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/inyo-felling-incident-hit-by-tree-2024

Horseshoe-Wild Bill Prescribed Fire Burned Line Gear - 2023

The complexity of tree felling operations called for removing line gear for firefighter safety—to quickly move along escape routes. Crewmembers removed their line gear and set them near the cleanup work on the felled hazard trees.
Focusing on the felling operations resulted in firefighters not paying atention to their line gear.

In our UTV we carried: two drip torches, two bladder bags, chainsaw, fuel/oil Dolmar, hand tools, and line gear.
We discovered that one of our drip torches had an incorrect collar that leaked because it could not properly seal. (This issue has been documented in previous events) We believe this drip torch fuel absorbed onto the crewmembers’ line gear. The line gear had
been placed at the edge of burned and unburned pine needles.
Aided by wind, the fire crept through the pine needle cast under the line gear. The fuel that had been absorbed into the material caused the line gear packs to be more flammable. The line gear was
discovered to be on fire when fusee firing devices ignited in the pack’s side pouches. Crewmembers applied their drinking water to the packs to extinguish the flames

Lessons
*Cold trail and/or scrape away fine fuel from gear set on the ground in active fire areas.
*Inspect drip torches for leaks before being placed with other equipment. Specifically check for mismatched components. Replace equipment not functioning properly.
*Avoid placing line gear and other personal PPE with fuel. Develop separate carry racks and mounts on vehicles.

Read this 3 page report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/horseshoe-wild-bill-prescribed-fire-burned-line-gear-2023

Blue Panther Prescribed Fire Broken Wheel Studs - 2024.
There have been multiple factory recalls related to wheel studs on Dodge Ram chassis. The crew in this situation was aware of the recall and had it completed at a dealership in 2021.
On April 19, 2024, at approximately 1800 hours, a Type 6 Engine with the crew was enroute to the Blue Panther Rx near Warm Springs, Virgina, for night operations.
The vehicle had a minor shake that was noticed about five minutes away from the destination. Soon after this shaking began, driving speeds were reduced to 35-40 mph, and an audible “clank” type noise was heard. This was believed to be a possible rock dislodged from the dualies. Within another minute or so, the vehicle lost both passenger-side rear wheels. The engine operator safely guided the apparatus off the road and onto the shoulder. Studs on the wheel had sheared completely off.

Lessons:
Conduct a Post-Recall Inspection. Simply completing a recall does not guarantee the prevention of related issues. In this incident, there was not a comprehensive inspection of the vehicle after completing the recall. A post-recall inspection should include a thorough examination of all components involved in the recall, including the wheel lugs.

Consider the use of a Commercial Indicator. The use of wheel nut
indicators will help to visually check your lug nuts to see if they are still properly torqued to the manufacture’s
specifications.
- It’s an efficient and effective method for identifying loose wheel nuts.
- Its high visibility simplifies safety inspections.

Read this 3 page RLS for more information including a link to the recall :
https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/blue-panther-prescribed-fire-broken-wheel-studs-2024

Compartment 22 Prescribed Fire Entrapment - March 2024

The Holding Boss requested that the engine, a local Type 4, prep a snag to prevent it from catching fire and endangering the public on the highway. The Engine Boss (ENGB) grabbed a council rake and attempted to access the snag area directly. This included climbing a three-strand barbed wire fence and navigating a patch of green vines
At this point, he observed there was “one tiny finger” of active fire
creeping in the brush 20-30 feet away with most of the fire about five chains away. He climbed over the fence and walked toward the snag (going approximately 20 feet), where he almost immediately encountered brush that he was unable to navigate.
Deciding to withdraw and try a new approach, the ENGB turned around,immediately noting that fire behavior had increased. His council rake was entangled in the brush. He therefore dropped it and continued toward the fence. After another step or two, he became completely entangled in the vines. At that point, the fuels around him “self-ignited.” The ENGB had nowhere to go.
During the next 15-30 seconds, all the fuels around and beneath him began to burn through. He was suspended in the air. He later recalled: “I felt like a puppet strung by a puppeteer”—caught above the approximately 6-inch flames.
The ENGB suffered a burn on his nose, 1st and 2nd degree burns to both elbows, both knees, and the back of one thigh. At the hospital he underwent surgery consisting of skin grafts to elbows and knees.

Lessons
Use the latest PPE.
While there were no visible “scorch” marks on the firefighter’s PPE, he did suffer burns to the elbows, which are recorded regularly in wildland fire situations similar to this one. Newer flame-resistant shirts are intentionally designed with double elbows to reduce injuries in situations just like occurred in this incident. Get flame-resistant shirts with double elbows.

Briars are hazardous – Do a practice walk.
Resources from out of the area or new to the area may not have previously navigated briars. Provide them field experience by
first walking them through the vegetation—without fire—to help reinforce the danger that briars pose during fire operations.

Read the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/compartment-22-prescribed-fire-entrapment-2024

Refueling Drip Torch Burn Injury - April 7 2024
One crewmember located the “jerry” can of torch mix but could not find the correct nozzle. After searching the truck, the crewmember attempted to pour the fuel into the drip torch with no nozzle. While refueling the drip torch, a “copious” amount of torch mix spilled on the ground as well as on the lower right pant leg and boot.
Over an hour after refueling the drip torch, the crewmember was continuing ignitions and was standing among the vegetation that they had just ignited. The crewmember remembers thinking “this is really hot.” Looking down, the crewmember noticed that their right leg was on fire.
Remembering "Stop, Drop, and Roll" the crewmember stopped, dropped, and tried to roll after stepping away from the vegetation. Unable to roll, due to having their fire pack on, the crewmember stood up and started patting their leg with gloved hands. Successful in extinguishing the fire with patting the leg, the crewmember immediately notified the firing squad leader.
The crewmember sustained 2nd degree burns on the lower right leg just above the boot line.

Lessons:
Have nozzles, use them.
If you get fuel on clothing - swap the clothing.
With fuel soaked clothing fires - stop, drop, and roll is NOT the best option. Removing clothing quickly is best.

Read this 4 page report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/huron-manistee-nf-prescribed-fire-burn-injury-2024

Lessons from an aviation incident.

"On October 31, 2023, an exclusive-use contracted Dassault Falcon-50 aircraft, carrying six passengers, experienced a loss of cabin pressure while departing Henderson Field, Midway Atoll. The crew performed an emergency descent and returned to Midway, where the pilot-in-command (PIC) determined that the mechanical malfunction was intermittent, and the flight would be attempted again. The Office of Aviation Services (OAS) was not notified. The passengers refused the second flight, and the flight crew departed again, only to experience another cabin pressurization malfunction, which resulted in another return to Midway."

Lessons Learned:
1. Kudos to the passengers for refusing the flight! All agency personnel are empowered to refuse a flight if an unsafe condition exists. Had the passengers accepted the second flight, they could have been exposed to hypoxia injuries, especially without an operable oxygen system.

Get the 3 page report here:https://www.doi.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2024-04/ll-2024-01.pdf

NEW Podcast Episode!

Travis Dotson and Kelly Woods talk about lessons the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center received in learning reviews and reports in 2023. Travis highlights some themes and shares his unique insights on data. Throughout the conversation, Travis and Kelly reference the Annual Incident Review Summary and the latest issue of Two More Chains which feature many of the lessons discussed and provide links to the source material. These documents can be downloaded at lessons.wildfire.gov.

https://wildfirelessons.podbean.com/e/episode-34-lessons-from-2023/

Episode 34 - Lessons From 2023 | Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center Travis Dotson and Kelly Woods talk about lessons the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center received in learning reviews and reports in 2023. Travis highlights some themes and shares his unique insights on data. Throughout the conversation, Travis and Kelly reference the Annual Incident Review Summary...

NEW Podcast Episode!

Firefighter Cancer and Wellbeing

Tune in to find out what recent presumptive illness legislation means for wildland firefighters.

Episode 33 - Firefighter Cancer and Wellbeing Erik Apland talks with Erin Phelps and Kat DuBose about wildland fire presumptive illness legislation, some lessons associated with filing a cancer-related claim with the Department of Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, and firefighter exposure to environmental hazards. Erin and K...

NEW Two More Chains!

What Did We Learn in 2023?

In this issue of Two More Chains, we focus on lessons gathered in 2023 and offer some specific calls to action.

Get it here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/two-more-chains

Dogwood Trail Tree Strike - January 2024, Texas.

While felling a sizeable southern magnolia (Magnolia grandiflora), a sawyer was struck in the face by a falling limb, resulting in multiple injuries.

As the tree started falling, the FAL3 trainee moved away from the tree at a 45-degree angle, as is taught during chainsaw training. The trainee moved a distance of about 20 feet, keeping an eye on the tree as it fell. Just before the tree hit the ground, a limb about three inches in diameter and three feet in length was observed falling from the crown in the direction of the trainee. The limb appeared to have pushed against a large pine and sprung back in the direction of the trainee. It happened very quickly and someone yelled out a warning. Just as the trainee was tilting his head up to look for overhead hazards, the limb struck him vertically across the forehead/nose area. It struck the front brim of his hard hat, pushing it off of his head to the rear and it smashed his safety glasses. He immediately fell to the ground.

The sawyer had several medical appointmnets where it was discovered his nose bone had several fractures, his nose cartilage was displaced, and he had a fracture to his right cheek bone. A surgeon determined that the bottom part of his nose was completely destroyed and would have to be surgically rebuilt.

Lesson from the report:
"It is universally understood and accepted that using chainsaws to cut down trees is a dangerous job, but that is typically the tool we grab when getting a tree on the ground is the task at hand. While it is not always viable in some instances, it may be possible to utilize other mechanical means to complete the job, trading time and expense for increased safety for personnel."

Read this 6 page report for more context and lessons:
https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/dogwood-trail-tree-strike-2024

New Podcast Episode!

Kelly Woods visits with Tyler Doggett in a candid conversation recorded in 2022 about some of the mental health difficulties that often accompany a career in wildland fire.

Tune in for a story about trauma, injury, healing, and hope.

Episode 32 - Chance, Pain, Healing, and Hope Kelly Woods visits with Tyler Doggett in a candid conversation about some of the mental health difficulties that often accompany a career in wildland fire. Tyler openly shares his story which includes a chance search and rescue, a shattered femur, battles with alcohol, and the loss of loved ones. It...

The full Annual Incident Review Summary is out!

All the incidents and accidents recorded last year summarized in 10 pages. Use this summary to guide your annual refreshers and prepare for the 2024 Fire Year.

Get the full document here:
https://lessons.wildfire.gov/annual-incident-review-summaries

Buchanan Ridge Fire UTV Rollover - December 2023

As the operator drove the UTV around the root ball, the front tire gained traction on the cut bank and quickly climbed up the bank, putting the center of gravity too high, causing a slow rollover.

Read this one page report here:

Buchanan Ridge Fire UTV Rollover 2023 | Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center Secure .gov websites use HTTPS A lock ( ) or https:// means you’ve safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.

In case you have not seen it yet - the initial numbers and lessons inforgraphic is out. This training aid provides a few numbers and lessons from the past year - find it here:
https://lessons.wildfire.gov/annual-incident-review-summaries

Lone Pine Fire Tree Strike - August 2023

Prior to engaging the crew on the second spot, Senior Firefighter1 scouted the area for hazards and conferred with Captain1. He identified a burning snag in the spot. He pushed on its base and “sounded” it with his hand tool. The height of the snag was difficult to determine because it was dark, but the snag held steady while he sounded it.
Sawyer1 and Sawyer2 continued cutting fireline with their swampers on the left flank as the rest of the crew arrived. Sawyer1 pointed out the snag to Sawyer2 and they cut their line wide around the hazard.
Sawyer2 communicated that he would work around Sawyer1 and his swamper while they finished bucking a log on the ground. As they progressed, Swamper1 was 5-10 feet away from Sawyer1, picking up the log that had just been cut. No one in the area heard a noise that would alert them to a falling tree. As Swamper1 turned back around, he saw the hazard snag falling toward Sawyer1.
As the top five feet of this 30-foot, p***y snag impacted Sawyer1 on the back of his hardhat, he dropped to the ground in a seated position. Swamper1 pulled Sawyer1 from under the burning snag. Sawyer2 heard the impact and looked behind him. He saw Sawyer1 on the ground and rushed to assist. Sawyer2 spoke to Sawyer1 and told him he had to move because there was fire all around him. He asked Sawyer1 to put his arms around him so he could help pull him away. Sawyer1 replied that he couldn’t lift his arms.

Over the radio, the crew heard “firefighter down, positive tree strike.”

For the rest of the story, read the full reoprt:
https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/lone-pine-fire-hit-by-tree-2023

Report includes a PPE Performance Report by the National Technology and Development Program

NEW Podcast Episode!

Episode 31 - Two More Chains – Fire Workers

Travis Dotson and Erik Apland discuss the most recent issue of the quarterly publication Two More Chains centered on the wildland fire worker. Travis and Erik talk about the history and explore a few of the hot buttons we face today as fire seasons and the workforce change.

Listen Here:

Episode 31 - Two More Chains – Fire Workers | Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center Travis Dotson and Erik Apland discuss the most recent issue of the quarterly publication Two More Chains centered on the wildland fire worker. Travis and Erik talk about the history and explore a few of the hot buttons we face today as fire seasons and the workforce change. Download the issue at: ht...

NEW Two More Chains!

Who Are We and How Do We Best Move Forward?

In this issue of Two More Chains, we explore what it means to be a wildland firefighter by considering how we got here, what makes us unique, what makes us the same and how we can best move forward.

Download the lateset issue here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/two-more-chains

Anvil Fire Medical Extraction - October 2023
At 1700 hours, a report of a medical emergency Incident Within an
Incident (IWI) came over the command repeater. The initial Medical Incident Report (MIR) was for “heat exhaustion, patient unable to walk and patient condition: Yellow” (“PRIORITY 2 – Serious Injury or illness. Evacuation may be DELAYED if necessary.”)
The firefighter’s location was in steep, rugged country with heavy timber, mid-slope in Duvall Creek drainage. A Rapid Extraction Module Support (REMS) Team Leader reached the patient in just minutes at 1704, having been enroute to the accident site after hearing radio chater on the Tac Channel.
A short-haul helicopter was available at the Helibase, a 5-minute flight away. However, the decision was made to carry the patient up the steep slope to a ridgeline that climbed more gently to a Drop Point that had access to a good road and crew vehicle. The total distance over terrain to the Drop Point was about one mile.
It was initially thought that the patient could be carried up the initial, steeper portion to the gentler ridge, giving the patient time to recover and hike out the remaining portion. The total time to the Drop Point was estimated to be 1-1.5 hours.
Once atop the steep section, it was determined the patient still could not walk and would have to be carried the remaining distance. Therefore, the total carry time was 3 hours and 18 minutes, with an ambulance ride still ahead.
They arrived at the Drop Point at 2052 hours, almost 2 hours after
sunset.

An AAR the following morning raised questions regarding risk management and what is the best tool for patient extraction given various IWI scenarios.

Is there a perception that a medical incident must be “Red” (“Priority 1”) before considering the use of extraction aircrat? A patient could even be “Green” yet be unable to walk with a twisted knee or ankle—and be in a compromised location due to geography or fire behavior.

Read more in the full report:
https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/anvil-fire-extraction-2023