Departamentul de filosofie teoretică

"Belief is said to be subject to a norm of truth. A norm, intuitively, tells us what we ought to or may do. What sort of claim can truth make on us? On one standard view, the truth norm of belief is obliging. One ought to believe the truth and truth only. On another view, the truth norm of belief is permissive. One may believe the truth and truth only. Recently, it has been argued that the truth norm plays no interesting role in our normative theorizing for it issues excessive, unsatisfiable claims. This paper defends the truth norm of belief and proposes a novel answer to the question concerning its normative force on a reason-based framework. I argue that the normative force of the truth norm depends on the weight of truth as a normative reason for belief, which, just like that of any other normative reason, may vary across different contexts. I develop the idea that the weight of truth as a reason for belief is conditioned by what an epistemic agent can or cannot believe and modified by epistemic risk, among other things."

The weight of truth - Synthese Belief is said to be subject to a norm of truth. A norm, intuitively, tells us what we ought to or may do. What sort of claim can truth make on us? On one standard view, the truth norm of belief is obliging. One ought to believe the truth and truth only. On another view, the truth norm of belief is....

"Proper names are typically considered to be devices of individual reference. Since Frege (1882), the debate has mainly concerned the proper semantic characteristics of this individual reference. Burge (J Philos 70:425–439, 1973) challenged this focus by highlighting the predicative uses of proper names and proposed that names are predicates even if they appear as bare singulars in the argument position. In turn, this unificatory account was subjected to criticism by Böer, Jeshion, and others, who provided counterexamples to the predicativist analysis of proper names. In this paper, I want to analyze the nonreferential uses of proper names, which, by being nonreferential, provide a challenge for both predicativism and referentialism about proper names. I critically examine the processes proposed as possible accounts of the problematic examples, i.e. deferred reference, meaning transfer, and coercion, and argue that they do not provide an adequate analysis. I propose an interpretive mechanism that accounts for these problematic uses of proper names, as well as a new principle for classifying the kinds of uses of proper names based on the interpretive mechanisms underlying those uses and which includes all of the kinds of uses discussed in the literature."

Deferred reference, meaning transfer or coercion? Toward a new principle of accounting for systematic uses of proper names - Synthese Proper names are typically considered to be devices of individual reference. Since Frege (1882), the debate has mainly concerned the proper semantic characteristics of this individual reference. Burge (J Philos 70:425–439, 1973) challenged this focus by highlighting the predicative uses of proper ...

"This paper is divided into two parts. In the first I outline and defend Elizabeth Anscombe's claim that consequentialism is a shallow philosophy by considering how two contemporary consequentialists reach opposing but equally outlandish moral conclusions on a matter as fundamental as whether it is good or bad that the human race continues. In the second I argue that in order to show what is wrong with the consequentialist arguments presented in part one, we need to deploy a wider range of critical resources than what typically appears in contemporary analytic moral philosophy. One example of a relevant and under-appreciated resource I then consider is satire as a mode of moral thought."

Anscombe on the shallowness of consequentialism This paper is divided into two parts. In the first I outline and defend Elizabeth Anscombe's claim that consequentialism is a shallow philosophy by considering how two contemporary consequentialists ...

"Journalists are often the adult public’s central source of scientific information, which means that their reporting shapes the relationship the public has with science. Yet philosophers of science largely ignore journalistic communication in their inquiries about trust in science. This paper aims to help fill this gap in research by comparing journalistic norm conflicts that arose when reporting on COVID-19 and to***co, among other policy-relevant scientific topics. I argue that the public’s image of scientists– as depositories of indisputable, value-free facts, trustworthy only when in consensus– makes it particularly difficult for journalists to ethically communicate policy-relevant science rife with disagreement. In doing so, I show how journalists, like scientists, face the problem of inductive risk in such cases. To overcome this problem, I sketch a model of trust in science that is grounded in an alternative image of scientists– what I call the responsiveness model of trust in science. By highlighting the process of science over its product, the responsiveness model requires scientists to respond to empirical evidence and the public’s values to warrant the public’s trust. I then show why this model requires journalists to be the public’s watchdogs by verifying and communicating whether scientists are being properly responsive both epistemically and non-epistemically."

Journalism and public trust in science - Synthese Journalists are often the adult public’s central source of scientific information, which means that their reporting shapes the relationship the public has with science. Yet philosophers of science largely ignore journalistic communication in their inquiries about trust in science. This paper aims ...

"The paper critiques two recent suggestions, by Lei Zhong and Thomas Kroedel, about how to apply the interventionist theory of causation to cases where supervenient properties, particularly mental properties, are involved. According to both suggestions, we should hold variables corresponding to supervenient properties fixed when intervening on the subvenient properties with respect to a putative effect variable and vice versa. The paper argues that both suggestions are problematic. Zhong’s suggestion ultimately requires ad hoc exemptions from the holding-fixed requirement. Kroedel’s suggestion entails severe constraints on the construction of causal models. Overall, retaining the holding-fixed requirements of interventionism for cases of supervenient properties comes at a significant price."

How not to intervene on mental causes - Philosophical Studies The paper critiques two recent suggestions, by Lei Zhong and Thomas Kroedel, about how to apply the interventionist theory of causation to cases where supervenient properties, particularly mental properties, are involved. According to both suggestions, we should hold variables corresponding to super...

Princeton-Bucharest-Hamburg summer school, 6th day. Sightseeing, boatriding and conclusions.

"Nelson Goodman observed that we use only certain ‘good’ (viz. projectible) predicates during reasoning, with no obvious demarcation criterion in sight to distinguish them from the bad and gruesome ones. This apparent arbitrariness undermines the justifiability of our reasoning practices. Inspired by Quine’s 1969 paper on Natural Kinds, Peter Gärdenfors proposes a cognitive criterion based on his theory of Conceptual Spaces (CS). He argues the good predicates are those referring to natural concepts, and that we can capture naturalness in terms of similarity. In contrast to Quine, he does not primarily rely on logic, but geometry. He frames his account as a descriptive project, however, and it is not obvious how it addresses the normative dimension of Goodman’s Riddle. This paper develops a charitable reconstruction of his argument, based on the idea that the instrumental success of our projectible concepts is grounded in their cognitive-pragmatic naturalness. It then explores three lines of reasoning against the argument: Evolutionarily motivated skepticism, the miracles argument, and the relation between instrumental and pragmatic success. I conclude that in its current form, the CS account fails to provide any justification of reasoning beyond appealing to its instrumental success, and that a metaphysically robust notion of naturalness helps to achieve the desired goal."

Conceptual Spaces: A Solution to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction? - Philosophia Nelson Goodman observed that we use only certain ‘good’ (viz. projectible) predicates during reasoning, with no obvious demarcation criterion in sight to distinguish them from the bad and gruesome ones. This apparent arbitrariness undermines the justifiability of our reasoning practices. Inspire...

"Machery, E. (2021). A new challenge to conceptual engineering. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1967190.) argues to have identified a novel reason why deficient concepts of a certain kind are better eliminated than reformed. Namely, if the deficient concept is an attractor—a concept that we are psychologically drawn to think with—then eliminating this concept is a more feasible alternative than reforming it. Machery illustrates his argument with the example of the scientific concept of innateness, which he considers to be an attractor. I argue two things against Machery's thesis. First, there is little reason to believe that attempts to eliminate the scientific concept of innateness will be more feasible than attempts to reform it. Second, there is little reason to believe that attempts to eliminate a concept, whether it is an attractor or not, are more feasible than attempts to reform it. Moreover, a concept being an attractor even diminishes—instead of increasing—the chances that eliminating it is more feasible than reforming it."

To reform or to eliminate an attractor? - Synthese Machery, E. (2021). A new challenge to conceptual engineering. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1967190 .) argues to have identified a novel reason why deficient concepts of a certain kind are better eliminated than reformed. Namely, if the d...

"The central pillar of Austin’s theory of speech acts is the three-way distinction between locutionary acts like saying, illocutionary acts like asserting, and perlocutionary acts like persuading [Austin, J. L. 1962. How To Do Things With Words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press] (VIII–IX). While the latter distinction has been widely accepted, the former distinction has been frequently rejected due to Searle’s objections, who argued that since Austin’s locutionary acts are supposed to be forceful in the sense contrasting with neutral expression of a content and all force is by Austin’s own definition illocutionary, the notion of a locutionary act collapses into that of an illocutionary act [Searle, J. 1968. “Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts.” The Philosophical Review 77 (4):405–424. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183008]. In this paper, I provide an interpretation of Austin’s distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts and defend it against Searle’s objections. I argue that Searle’s main objection relies on mistakenly running together two notions of ‘force’: the notion of representational force as presentation-as-true and the Austinian notion of illocutionary force as the social-communicative significance of the speech act. Once we distinguish these we can see that although Searle is correct that Austin’s locutionary acts are forceful in the former sense, he’s mistaken in thinking that such force is illocutionary. Given this, his objection that locutionary acts collapse into illocutionary acts misses its mark."

‘Austin vs. Searle on locutionary and illocutionary acts' The central pillar of Austin’s theory of speech acts is the three-way distinction between locutionary acts like saying, illocutionary acts like asserting, and perlocutionary acts like persuading [A...

Our artist in residence, master student and artist Melania Tucureanu. Illustrating collaboration (and controversy). Princeton Bucharest Hamburg summer school.

"In 2014, Christian List and I published a paper that delineated our view regarding what it takes for an agent to act freely. We suggested that this requires the action to be endorsed by the agent and caused by this endorsement and yet not be necessitated. Free action requires indeterminism at the agential level—the kind of indeterminism that is compatible with physical determinism. I still think that our proposal was on the right track, but I believe it needs elaboration. As we already noted in the paper, our formal modelling—a standard branching model—was too extensional, and therefore in need of revision. Also, on a substantive side, what we say about the causal component of our proposal does not quite take care of the danger of ‘flukishness’ of an undetermined action. It was this threat to agential control that the requirement of causation by endorsement was meant to disarm in the first place. But the threat still remains and needs to be confronted. Revising the formal model and finding a solution to the problem of flukishness are my two objectives in this paper."

Two intuitions about free will—Some afterthoughts In 2014, Christian List and I published a paper that delineated our view regarding what it takes for an agent to act freely. We suggested that this requires the action to be endorsed by the agent and...

"Despite recent essentialist approaches to Kant’s laws of nature, it is unclear whether Kant’s critical philosophy is compatible with core tenets of essentialism. In this paper, I first reconstruct Kant’s position by identifying the key metaphysical and epistemological features of his notion of ‘nature’ or ‘essence’. Two theses about natures can be found in the literature, namely that they are noumenal in character (noumenal thesis) and that they guide scientific investigation as regulative ideas of reason (regulative thesis). I argue that Kant’s notion of nature does not entail the noumenal thesis and, based on his model of causal explanation, I propose a novel, phenomenal thesis, that allows for a better understanding of the function of natures as regulative ideas. In the last part of the paper, I show that Kant’s ‘essentialism’ is a genuine form of essentialism committed to de re modality, although it differs in several respects from major contemporary essentialist accounts. I conclude by suggesting that Kant’s essentialism (if appropriately updated) can be relevant to the contemporary debate, which has so far been dominated by Humean and Aristotelian proposals."

Natures, ideas, and essentialism in Kant - Synthese Despite recent essentialist approaches to Kant’s laws of nature, it is unclear whether Kant’s critical philosophy is compatible with core tenets of essentialism. In this paper, I first reconstruct Kant’s position by identifying the key metaphysical and epistemological features of his notion of...

"This paper argues for the significance of Kaplan's logic LD in two ways: first, by looking at how logic got along before we had LD, and second, by using it to bring out the similarity between David Hume's thesis that one cannot deduce claims about the future on the basis of premises only about the past, and the so-called "essentiality" of the indexical."
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/share/YIZGM7CFWFKHDUMXGYES?target=10.1111/theo.12543

"It is argued that in order to properly engage with the debate regarding the ethics of belief one first needs to determine the nature of the propositional attitude in question. This point is illustrated by discussing a related topic from social philosophy, broadly conceived, concerning the nature of, and inter-relationship between, delusions and the Wittgensteinian notion of a hinge commitment. Are we to understand either or both of these notions as beliefs? Are delusions a kind of hinge commitment? In answering these questions we will appeal to a distinction between folk belief and knowledge-apt belief. It is argued that while both delusions and hinge commitments count as beliefs in the former sense, neither is a belief in the latter sense. Moreover, once we understand what is involved in the notion of a hinge commitment, it will also become clear why delusions are not hinge commitments. It is claimed that by gaining an understanding of delusions and hinge commitments, and thereby of two fundamental ways of thinking about belief, we will be in a better position to determine what is at issue in the ethics of belief debate."

Beliefs, delusions, hinge commitments - Synthese It is argued that in order to properly engage with the debate regarding the ethics of belief one first needs to determine the nature of the propositional attitude in question. This point is illustrated by discussing a related topic from social philosophy, broadly conceived, concerning the nature of,...

De pe bloguri:

David Papineau on AI and Agency David Papineau talks about AI and Agency

"Much of contemporary metaethics revolves around the issue of “naturalism.” However, there is little agreement on what “naturalism” is or why it should be of significance. In this paper, I aim to rectify this situation by providing a set of necessary conditions on what positions ought to count as “naturalistic.” A metaethical view should count as an instance of naturalism only if it claims that there can be evidence for normative claims that is both public and spatiotemporal. I argue that, unlike other characterizations of “naturalism,” this view shows a clear difference between many metaethical positions and the sciences. The view thereby renders debates about naturalism philosophically significant: the division between naturalists and non-naturalists is that between philosophers who hold that ethics is relevantly similar to the sciences and those who deny this."

Experience and naturalism Much of contemporary metaethics revolves around the issue of “naturalism.” However, there is little agreement on what “naturalism” is or why it should be of significance. In this paper, I aim to rect...

21st Princeton-Bucharest seminar in Early Modern Philosophy, first Princeton-Bucharest-Hamburg summer school fof doctoral and postdoctoral students.

"In this paper I raise a paradox of belief inspired by Kripke’s ‘paradox of knowledge', which states that knowledge seems to make permissible an intuitively unacceptable form of dogmatism. This paradox of belief is based on an intuitively correct principle of doxastic coherence. My aim is to show that this paradox contributes to elucidating the puzzling nature of belief."

A new paradox of belief In this paper I raise a paradox of belief inspired by Kripke’s ‘paradox of knowledge', which states that knowledge seems to make permissible an intuitively unacceptable form of dogmatism. This para...

Radio time!

What's your story? Life narrative and "main character" thinking - ABC listen If you're like most people, you probably think about your life as a story - it has a beginning, a middle and an end, and the main character in the story is... you. But this seemingly "natural" main character thinking is deeply culturally determined, and it can limit us in the ways that we evaluate o...

"Bernard Mandeville argued that traits that have traditionally been seen as detrimental or reprehensible, such as greed, ambition, vanity, and the willingness to deceive, can produce significant social goods. He went so far as to suggest that a society composed of individuals who embody these vices would, under certain constraints, be better off than one composed only of those who embody the virtues of self-restraint. In the twentieth century, Mandeville’s insights were taken up in economics by John Maynard Keynes, among others. More recently, philosophers have drawn analogies to Mandeville’s ideas in the domains of epistemology and morality, arguing that traits that are typically understood as epistemic or moral vices (e.g. closed-mindedness, vindictiveness) can lead to beneficial outcomes for the groups in which individuals cooperate, deliberate, and decide, for instance by propitiously dividing the cognitive labor involved in critical inquiry and introducing transient diversity. We argue that mandevillian virtues have a negative counterpart, mandevillian vices, which are traits that are beneficial to or admirable in their individual possessor, but are or can be systematically detrimental to the group to which that individual belongs. Whilst virtue ethics and epistemology prescribe character traits that are good for every moral and epistemic agent, and ideally across all situations, mandevillian virtues show that group dynamics can complicate this picture. In this paper, we provide a unifying explanation of the main mechanism responsible for mandevillian traits in general and motivate the case for the opposite of mandevillian virtues, namely mandevillian vices."

Mandevillian vices - Synthese Bernard Mandeville argued that traits that have traditionally been seen as detrimental or reprehensible, such as greed, ambition, vanity, and the willingness to deceive, can produce significant social goods. He went so far as to suggest that a society composed of individuals who embody these vices w...

Colegii noștri Dana Jalobeanu și Andrei Mărășoiu participă la congresul din acest an (al cincisprezecelea) al International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science (HOPOS 2024).
Congresul este organizat de către Universitatea din Viena și se va desfășura între 9-12 iulie 2024. Programul evenimentului poate fi găsit aici: https://hopos2024.univie.ac.at/program/

https://filosofie.unibuc.ro/colegii-nostri-dana-jalobeanu-si-andrei-marasoiu-prezenti-la-al-xv-lea-congres-al-hopos/

"This paper argues that Nietzsche is deliberately imprecise in his characterization of what he calls the slave revolt in morality. In particular, none of the people or groups he nominates as instigators of the slave revolt, namely, Jewish priests, the Jewish people, the prophets, Jesus, and Paul, were literally slaves. Analysis of Nietzsche's texts, including his usage of the term “slaves,” and his sources concerning those he nominates as the instigators of the slave revolt, make clear that Nietzsche knew none of these were literally slaves. He calls it a slave revolt because he means that the propagators of that revolt preached what he takes to be the slavish values, including, humility, compassion, obedience, and lack of egoism. He uses the high loaded term “slave” both to disparage those values and, most importantly, to bring home to his readers the message that they, as inheritors of Judeo-Christian values, actual adhere to and practice the debased slavish values preached, but not necessarily practiced, by the original instigators of the slave revolt. For Nietzsche, his readers are strangers to themselves, thus he notes “slavery is everywhere visible, although it does not call itself as such.”"

Who are Nietzsche's slaves? This paper argues that Nietzsche is deliberately imprecise in his characterization of what he calls the slave revolt in morality. In particular, none of the people or groups he nominates as instigato...

Dacă vă gândiți că ați vrea să înțelegeți mai mult din lumea asta în care trăim, dacă vreți să nu vă simțiți copleșiți că aveți prea mult de citit, prea mult de asimilat, dacă vreți să vă adaptați mai ușor la schimbare, să aveți o gândire ordonată și o privire de ansamblu asupra lucrurilor; dacă vreți să identificați rapid știrile false, să înțelegeți mecanismele manipulării, să discerneți între adevărat și fals și să înțelegeți cm funcționează, de fapt, gândirea.... atunci e cazul să veniți la Facultatea de Filosofie. Nu contează câți ani aveți, sau ce ați mai studiat înainte. La Filosofie vin tot mai mulți oameni care caută cele de mai sus. Și mulți dintre ei primesc, bonus, o pasiune care-i va ține toată viața.

"Dating apps such as Tinder are designed to be played like a game. Users play by swiping left and right on others' profiles to indicate whether they are romantically or sexually interested in them. They match with those who reciprocate their interest. The goal of the game is to match with as many people as possible, prioritizing rapid gratification over the pursuit of meaningful connections. Tinder's design elements and monetization strategies incentivize users to prioritize gathering matches, replacing the complexity of actual dating with a series of discrete decisions. Playing the matching game on Tinder makes dating more immediately gratifying, so users have started to play the game as an end in itself. The app becomes a source of entertainment instead of a means to build valuable connections. This also transforms the activity of dating as users spend time building appealing profiles and attempt to manipulate the algorithm to maximize their matching potential. Gamifying our romantic and sexual lives has negative consequences on people's self-image as their personal worth becomes entwined with their success on the app. Individuals are reduced to mere players in the game, and the algorithm itself disproportionately favors users with conventional preferences. Gamification can be dangerous when the boundary between the game and real life blurs."

The gamification of dating online Dating apps such as Tinder are designed to be played like a game. Users play by swiping left and right on others' profiles to indicate whether they are romantically or sexually interested in them. Th...

Proaspătă încheiată sesiunea până atunci, vă așteptăm cu drag la o conferință ce ne întreabă ceva simplu: ce sunt cuvintele? Avem un răspuns convingător? Poate face față analizei lingviștilor și filosofilor?

Veniți să aflăm. Față în față, vineri, 5 iulie, ora 17, în sala Blaga de la Filosofie (Splaiul Independenței nr. 204).

Mai multe detalii despre conferențiar puteți afla la https://epp.ok.ubc.ca/about/contact/manuela-ungureanu/, iar despre întreaga serie de conferințe din acest an la https://philevents.org/event/show/115878

Prelegerea Manuelei Ungureanu (U. British Columbia) face parte dintr-o serie de evenimente susținute de programul masteral "Analytic Philosophy", singurul master de cercetare exclusiv în filosofie din România. Mai multe detalii despre program găsiți la https://filosofie.unibuc.ro/master-of-arts-in-analytic-philosophy/

"The paper defends a version of the view that agency is a causal power, the “causing view.” After sketching the view, and explaining how it differs from its rivals, various challenges are assessed. A family of objections says that causing change is neither necessary nor sufficient for acting. The second challenge centers on an Aristotelian thesis about the relation between an action (A's opening a window) and the corresponding passion (the window's being opened by A). The final objection concerns the dynamic nature of acting: the claim is that a causal view of agency cannot accommodate actions “in progress” or mere activity. I conclude that none of the objections examined presents unsurmountable problems for the causal view of agency which, at least in the version here defended, remains a highly plausible and attractive view."

Acting as causing change The paper defends a version of the view that agency is a causal power, the “causing view.” After sketching the view, and explaining how it differs from its rivals, various challenges are assessed. A ...

"Alonzo Church proposed a powerful and elegant theory of sequences of functions and their arguments as surrogates for Russellian singular propositions and singular concepts. Church’s proposed theory accords with his Alternative (0), the strictest of his three competing criteria for strict synonymy. The currently popular objection to strict criteria like (0) on the basis of the Russell–Myhill antinomy is here rebutted. Russell–Myhill is not a problem specifically for Alternative (0); it is a refutation of unrestrained concept comprehension. Unrestricted comprehension is also inconsistent with facts about sets of properties. Criteria more lax than (0) are philosophically inadequate. In particular, the rival conception of propositions as classes of possible worlds is subject to a fatal philosophical collapse. It follows on that conception, given that each of us is fallible, that everyone believes everything. It is shown, however, that Church’s proposed theory is vulnerable under (0) to a version of Russell’s notorious Gray’s Elegy objection. Some amendments to Church’s proposal are proffered, including an amendment, first proposed in the author’s Frege’s Puzzle (1986), that addresses Russell’s objection. Church’s response (personal correspondence) is considered."

Singular concepts - Synthese Alonzo Church proposed a powerful and elegant theory of sequences of functions and their arguments as surrogates for Russellian singular propositions and singular concepts. Church’s proposed theory accords with his Alternative (0), the strictest of his three competing criteria for strict synonymy....

Un pic de metalogică:

Sequent Calculi for First-order $$\textrm{ST}$$ ST - Journal of Philosophical Logic Strict-Tolerant Logic ( $$\textrm{ST}$$ ST ) underpins naïve theories of truth and vagueness (respectively including a fully disquotational truth predicate and an unrestricted tolerance principle) without jettisoning any classically valid laws. The classical sequent calculus without Cut is sometime...